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The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers.'
Sadly, Shakespeare's epigram may well bespeak the current mood,
if not the preferred method, of a Watergate-weary American pub-
lic; and self-appointed ombudsmen have not been loathe to synthesize
this popular sentiment into a predictable series of newspaper articles,
speeches, hearings, and reports decrying divers practices of the bar.
Among the unflattering things that have been said about this country's
lawyers is that they annually overcharge their customers an estimated
1.5 billion dollars because of their failure to compete effectively with
THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
1. VON KALINOWSKr, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, ANTITRUST LAws AND TRADE REGu-
LATION (1972) [hereinafter cited as J. VON KALINowSic].
1. W. SHAKESPEARE, King Henry VI, Part I1, Act IV, Sc. 2, Line 86.
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one another.2  Some of the bar's more iconoclastic members have
concluded that their brothers' uncharacteristic dearth of competitive-
ness in the setting of fees may be more a result of organized price-fix-
ing than the indicia of empathetic ennui. Organized price-fixing would
in most contexts appear to be in contravention of the federal antitrust
laws. But the defenders of bar association minimum fee schedules-
the manifestation of organized price-fixing by lawyers-have suggested
several ingenious, if not ingenuous, rationales by which the fixing of
legal prices might be held legal.3 In the recent case of Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar,4 the one court of appeals to have considered these ar-
guments found them persuasive; but the Supreme Court has yet to
rule on the matter,5 and the District Court for Oregon, disagreeing with
2. L.A. Times, Sept. 29, 1974, Part 1, at 19-20, col. 1, quoting Sen. John Tunney
quoting an estimate by Group Legal Institute of California. If this estimate is correct,
it implies that each of the nation's approximately 400,000 practicing lawyers receives, on
the average, $3,750 "excess" compensation annually.
3. The legality and utility of fee schedules have been the subject of extensive com-
mentary. See Arnould & Corley, Fee Schedules Should Be Abolished, 57 A.B.A.J. 655
(1971); Note, A Critical Analysis of Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules, 85
HARv. L. REv. 971 (1972); Note, Antitrust Violation: Minimum Bar Fees-Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 10 IDAHO L. REv. 257 (1974); Comment, Minimum Fee Schedules
v. Antitrust: The Goldfarb Affair, 45 MIss. L.J. 162 (1974); Comment, Anxiety in
the Legal Profession: Fee Schedules and Antitrust, 19 S. D. L. REv. 400 (1974);
Note, Goldfarb Fights the Bar, 27 Sw. L.J. 524 (1973); Comment, Minimum Fee
Schedules: An Antitrust Problem, 48 TUL. L. REV. 682 (1974); Note, Bar Association
Fee Schedules and Suggested Alternatives: Reflections on a Sherman Exemption That
Doesn't Exist, 3 U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REv. 207 (1974); Note, Antitrust Law: An
Application of the Sherman Act to the Professions, 25 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 740 (1973);
Note, Attorneys' Minimum Fee Schedules-A Violation of the Sherman Act, 9 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 616 (1973); Note, The Wisconsin Fee Schedule: A Problem of Anti-
trust, 1968 Wis. L. REV. 1237.
4. 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 223 (1974). The same plain-
tiffs brought two actions, one against the Virginia State Bar and one against the Fairfax
County Bar. The cases were consolidated, and the question of liability severed from
that of damages. The district court found liability on the part of the local, but not the
state bar. 355 F. Supp. 491 (E.D. Va. 1973). The Fourth Circuit affirmed with respect
to the state bar on the ground that it shared the state's immunity from antitrust suit.
497 F.2d at 12. The appellate court reversed the district court ruling against the local
bar and held that lawyers practice a learned profession not subject to the regulation
of the antitrust laws, id. at 15, and that the practice of law in northern Virginia does
not affect interstate commerce, id. at 18-19. Since this last finding defeats jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act, the court's first two conclusions are arguably dicta.
5. The Goldfarb decision has been granted review in the Supreme Court. Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 223 (1974).
In an apparent effort to render the case moot, the Fairfax County Bar has dropped
its fee schedule. L.A. Times, supra note 2, at 20, col. 2; Washington Post, Sept.
24, 1974, Metro, at 1, col. 1. It would appear that there is still a live contro-
versy between the parties, however, since the Goldfarbs continue to press their claims
against the Virginia State Bar and are seeking damages for alleged past violations.
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the Fourth Circuit's Goldfarb holding, has refused to grant the Oregon
Bar Association's motion for summary judgment in an antitrust-
price-fixing suit brought against it by the Justice Department. 6
After a brief review of the status of minimum fee schedules in
America today, this Comment will start with a proposition that ap-
pears inescapable: on the surface of things, the promulgation of mini-
mum fees, even "suggested" minimum fees, violates the antitrust laws;
and the violation is made all the more egregious because of the pres-
ence of legal alternative methods of serving the legitimate (and perhaps
even constitutionally mandated) objective of informing potential cli-
ents about the fees they may expect to be charged. The Comment
will then examine each of the three rationales that are suggested to per-
mit price-fixing by lawyers: that lawyers do not "engage in" or "af-
fect" interstate commerce; that the practice of law is a "learned profes-
sion" outside the reach of the antitrust laws, or, similarly, that mini-
mum fees have a "noncommercial" purpose and therefore do not
run afoul of the proscriptions of those laws; and that a bar associa.
tion's recommendation of minimum fees is a state activity sheltered
from the antitrust plaintiff by the umbrella of a state's antitrust im-
munity.7
The Status of Fee Schedules Today
Although the administration of fee schedules was once one of the
common activities of most state bar associations, inquiries sent to the
bar associations of thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia'
have revealed that statewide fee schedules are very nearly extinct, a
casualty of heavy pressure from the Justice Department and the spec-
See Petitioners' Reply Brief for Certiorari at 2-3, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497
F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 223 (1974). Further, it is generally held
that the voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not make a case moot,
even when only injunctive relief is sought. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345
U.S. 629, 632 (1953). Earlier, the Supreme Court had indicated that
[w]hen defendants are shown to have settled into a continuing practice or en-
tered into a conspiracy violative of the antitrust laws, courts will not assume
that it has been abandoned without clear proof . . . . It is the duty of the
courts to beware of efforts to defeat injunctive relief by protestations of repent-
ance and reform, especially when abandonment seems timed to anticipate suit,
and there is probability of resumption. United States v. Oregon State Medi-
cal Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326, 333 (1952).
6. United States v. Oregon State Bar, 43 U.S.L.W. 2234 (D. Ore. Nov. 25, 1974).
7. The three issues to be discussed here (interstate commerce, "learned profes-
sion" exemption and "state action" exemption) are those presented in the Goldfarbs'
petition for certiorari. Petition for Certiorari at 2-3, Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar,
497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 223 (1974).
8. This survey was conducted by mail during September, 1974. The responses of
the bar associations are on file at the offices of the Duke Law Journal.
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tre of enormous potential antitrust liability. Of the thirty-five associ-
ations responding, only three indicated that they still published sched-
ules at the state level.9 Thirteen stated tersely that no statewide min-
imums are now in effect, 10 while nineteen more indicated that they
had abandoned or suspended the practice of setting minimum fees, most
during the last few years."
While this revolution in the practices of the state bars may well
have eliminated one class of potential antitrust defendants, it has not
mooted the debate over the lawfulness of fee schedules, since many
local bar associations continue to cling to them tenaciously.' 2 Further-
more, it appears that the local bars may be more vulnerable to anti-
trust attack than their state counterparts. While a state bar associa-
tion can arguably claim that its activities are those of the state and are
thus blessed with the state's immunity from federal antitrust actions,' 3
even the Fourth Circuit is willing to concede that a local bar associa-
tion is not sheltered by the state's immunity.14
It remains unclear to what extent those state bar associations
which have abolished their own fee schedules nevertheless continue to
discipline those who undercut minimum fees set at the local level.
If the local schedules are unlawful, such conduct might itself make the
state bar part of the conspiracy to restrain trade. Such liability seems
remote, however. Judge Craven, concurring in the Goldfarb major-
ity's rejection of liability for the state bar association, indicated that he
would have justified its exoneration on the grounds that it played an
"exceedingly 'minor role.' "5 He was convinced by the lower court's
finding:
9. New Hampshire, Oregon, and Texas.
10. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Kansas, Nevada, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington.
11. Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, Tennessee, Utah, and Wisconsin.
12. Until faced with the possibility of losing in the Supreme Court, the Fairfax
County Bar, a defendant in Goldfarb, had maintained a fee schedule, although the parent
Virginia Bar had not. While the California Bar Association maintains no minimum
fee schedule, its constituent local bar associations continue to do so. L.A. Times,
supra note 2, at 18, col. 4. Neither the ABA nor the Justice Department has current
information on local fee schedules, both because of the empirical problem of gathering
it, and because many local bars refuse to disclose their fee schedules to any nonmembers.
Id.
13. See Part IV infra.
14. 497 F.2d at 12.
15. Id. The Goldfarbs had sought to establish state bar liability on the basis of
[Virginia] State Bar Opinion 98 (June 1, 1960), which stated that any attorney who
repeatedly charged less than the minimum fee set by his local association could be sub-
ject to discipline. 497 F.2d at 4.
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[The district judge] found that the State Bar did not promulgate the
minimum fee schedule, did not endorse or approve it, never under-
took to discipline any attorney for violating it, and never contem-
plated any such action. All the State Bar ever did, apparently, was to
suggest that local associations might wish to adopt a minimum fee
schedule and to circulate reports on the schedules that local bar as-
sociations had adopted. 16
Judge Craven's position can be supported by a Supreme Court deci-
sion if it is assumed that the position of the state bar association is anal-
ogous to that of the National Association in United States v. National
Association of Real Estate Boards. 7  In that case, the government
tried to rely on the code of ethics and bylaws of the National Associ-
ation to establish its part in the restraint of trade.' 8 The Court con-
cluded that the national group's relationship to local association price-
fixing was at best "a somewhat attenuated one."'19 Thus, the focus of
future litigation in most states is probably destined to be at the local
level.
The ABA has been ambivalent. In 1961, it cautioned that "the
habitual charging of fees less than those established in suggested or
recommended fee schedules . . .may be evidence of unethical con-
duct."20  In 1970, the Association retrenched somewhat, and an-
nounced that "mere failure to follow a minimum fee schedule, even
when habitual, can not, standing alone and absent evidence of miscon-
duct, afford a basis for disciplinary action."12' However, the contem-
poraneously enacted Code of Professional Responsibility provided in
the Disciplinary Rules that "[flactors to be considered as guides in de-
termining the reasonableness of a fee include . . . [t]he fee customar-
ily charged in the locality for similar legal services. 22  The Ethical
Considerations section of the Code provided that "[sluggested fee
schedules and economic reports of state and local bar associations pro-
vide some guidance on the subject of reasonable fees."2  During its
1974 summer meeting, the ABA amended the Code to omit all refer-
16. 497 F.2d at 21.
17. 339 U.S. 485 (1950). See note 75 infra. But see United States v. National
Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs, 43 U.S.L.W. 2269 (D.D.C. Dec. 12, 1974) (national en-
gineering society's liability under Sherman Act predicated on code of ethics prohibiting
competitive bidding, despite fact that national society had no enforcement powers, where
it coordinated and encouraged stated society policing actions).
18. Id. at 495.
19. Id.
20. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETMCS, OPINIONS, No. 302 (1961).
21. Id. No. 323 (1970).
22. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RFsPONSIBILrrY DR 2-106(B)(3) (1969).
23. Id. EC 2-18 (1969).
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ence to fee schedules, but apparently left standing the earlier rulings
that failure to follow fee schedules could be evidence of misconduct. 24
Since it is hard to see how failure to adhere to a minimum fee sched-
ule, i.e., charging too little, could be relevant to any bona fide ethical
consideration, it appears that the Association is reluctant to abandon
the concept of fee schedules altogether. On the other hand, the portent
of litigation has led the ABA's leadership to call publicly on state and
local bar associations to drop their fee schedules.25
I. FEE SCHEDULES AS A PER SE VIOLATION OF
THE ANTITRUST LAWS
A. The Nature of Bar Associations' Exposure to Antitrust Liability2"
The practices of bar associations are subject to attack by a variety
of public and private plaintiffs under numerous federal statutory pro-
visions, for Congress has granted both public agencies and private par-
ties wide latitude in suing under the antitrust laws. Both civil and
criminal actions can be maintained by the Justice Department, either
alternatively or simultaneously. 27  The Federal Trade Commission is
also granted enforcement powers,2 and the enforcers need not defer
to each other in bringing an action, although in practice they do use
a clearance procedure to avoid duplication of investigative effort.20
The private plaintiff may sue for damages, injunctive relief, or both, 0
and need not await the outcome of government litigation, although he
will usually do S0.31
The private treble damage action has been a part of the antitrust
laws since it first appeared in 1890 in the Sherman Act. The Clayton
Act of 1914 expanded the scope of this authorization, and today, sec-
tion four of the Clayton Act is the basic mandate for private relief. It
24. Amendments to the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility 2 (effective
March 1, 1974).
25. Remarks of Mr. Chesterfield Smith, Immediate Past President, American Bar
Association, at Duke University School of Law, Nov. 7, 1974.
26. The material in this section, and some of the material in the following section,
is included to provide background for the general reader. The reader familiar with
antitrust law may safely skip to the text accompanying note 72 infra.
27. See Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 52 (1912).
28. The Federal Trade Commission is specifically delegated certain enforcement
powers. See 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1970). The violations subject to FTC action include price
discrimination violations, id. § 13, unlawful contracts requiring an agreement not to
use the goods of a competitor, id. § 14, corporate acquisitions tending to lessen compe-
tition, id. § 18, and interlocking directors and officers, id. § 19.
29. J. VAN CISE, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAws 200 (1970 ed.).
30. 15 U.S.C. H9 15, 26 (1970).
31. J. VAN CQsn, supra note 29, at 200.
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provides that "[a]ny person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages by him sus-
tained . *...,2 Section sixteen of the same Act authorizes injunctive
actions: "Any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be enti-
tled to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . against threatened loss
or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws. .. .
The law governing the right of private parties to sue is complex
and uncertain,3 4 largely because of the absence of definitive guidance
from the Supreme Court on a number of important questions. Basic-
ally, the private plaintiff must prove (1) that the alleged violation has
injured his business or property,35 and (2) that his injury was a "direct"
consequence of the violation. 36  Among those who have been granted
standing to sue for damages and/or injunctive relief3 7 are competitors,38
suppliers,39 licensees, 40 franchisees, 41 football players,42 and, most signi-
32. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Section seven of the Sherman Act authorizing such
suits was repealed in 1955 because section four of the Clayton Act superseded it. Act
of July 7, 1955, ch. 283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283.
33. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1970). All actions commenced under either section four of
the Clayton Act for damages or under section sixteen for injunctive relief must be
brought in the federal district courts. General Inv. Co. v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry.,
260 U.S. 261, 286-87 (1922). Thus, the state courts lack jurisdiction to entertain anti-
trust claims based on the federal laws. See Gold Fuel Serv., Inc. v. Esso Standard Oil
Co., 32 N.J. 459, 161 A.2d 246, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 882 (1960). The federal anti-
trust statutes contain their own jurisdictional provisions; therefore, neither diversity of
citizenship nor a minimum dollar amount is required. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
34. See 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 9020, at 15,021.
35. See Sam S. Goldstein Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 728, 733-
34 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Thurston v. Setab Computer Institute, 48 F.R.D. 134, 135
(S.D.N.Y. 1969); Delaware Valley Marine Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 184
F. Supp. 440, 449 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
36. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak, 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910). While the decisions
relating to "directness" of injury are varied in their approach, the practical effect of the
requirement is that plaintiff's injuries must be proximately caused by defendant's activi-
ties. The Second Circuit has stated the rule as follows: 'Those harmed only inci-
dentally by antitrust violations have no standing to sue for treble damages; only those at
whom the violation is directly aimed, or who have been directly harmed may recover."
Productive Inventions, Inc. v. Trico Prod. Corp., 224 F.2d 678, 679 (2d Cir. 1955).
37. While actual injury must be shown for a damage recovery, a showing of a
threatened or dangerous probability of injury is sufficient in a suit seeking injunctive
relief. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130-31
(1969); Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Stone Cutters' Ass'n, 274 U.S. 37,
54-55 (1927). The requirement of showing proximate cause between the threatened
injury and the antitrust violation is applicable in an injunction action just as it is in
damage actions. Schwartz v. General Elec. Co., 107 F. Supp. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
38. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
39. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219
(1948).
40. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
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ficantly, customers.43 It is thus clear that consumers of legal services
have standing to challenge bar association practices which may affect
the prices they must pay.
Section one of the Clayton Act"4 defines the "antitrust laws" to
include the Sherman Act,45 certain sections of the Wilson Tariff Act of
1894,46 and the Clayton Act itself.4r In order to bring a private ac-
tion for damages or injunctive relief, it is therefore necessary to allege
a violation of one of these laws, since the Supreme Court has held that
the enumeration in the Clayton Act is exhaustive as far as the private
litigant is concerned. 48  The substantive provisions of the "antitrust
laws" are sections one49 and three50 of the Sherman Act, prohibiting
contracts, combinations, or conspiracies in restraint of trade; section
two of Sherman,51 prohibiting monopolies or conspiracies to monopo-
lize; sections two (a) through (f) of the Clayton Act,52 prohibiting
various forms of price discrimination; section three of Clayton,53
prohibiting tying arrangements and exclusive dealing contracts; sec-
41. Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
42. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
43. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1970).
45. Id. §§ 1-6.
46. Id. §§ 8-11.
47. Id. §§ 12, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27; 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1970).
48. "In light of the much other so-called antitrust legislation enacted prior and
subsequent to the Clayton Act, it seems plain that the rule expressio unius exclusio
alterius is applicable . . . ." Nashville Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 375-
76 (1958). Private suits based upon alleged violations of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. (1970), are not permitted, even though the Act embraces
many of the practices declared unlawful in the Sherman and Clayton Acts. See Carlson
v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 281 (9th Cir. 1973); Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp.,
485 F.2d 986, 1002 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Note, Judicial Refusal to Imply a Private Right
of Action Under the FTCA, 1974 DuKE L.J. 506. Enforcement of the FTCA is left
to the Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department.
Certain provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act amended section four of the Clay-
ton Act and as such are considered part of the antitrust laws. However, section three
of the Robinson-Patman Act, forbidding discriminatory and predatory pricing, is not
considered an antitrust law, the violation of which gives a private party the right to sue.
Of course, to the extent that the practices forbidden by section three of Robinson-
Patman fall within the more general proscriptions of section two of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), they are actionable, but only under Clayton. Nashville Milk
Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373 (1958); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Vance, 355 U.S. 389
(1958).
49. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
50. Id. § 3. Section three is similar to section one but applies to trade or com-
merce within the District of Columbia.
51. Id. § 2.
52. Id. §§ 13(a)-(f).
53. Id. § 14.
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tion seven of Clayton, 4 prohibiting certain corporate acquisitions of
stock or assets; and section eight of Clayton,55 prohibiting interlocking
directorates. 0 Although a number of these provisions might conceiv-
ably have application to various practices of the legal profession, it is
the majestic sweep of section one of the Sherman Act5V7 which has been
held to ban price fixing, and which thus must provide the starting point
for any inquiry into the lawfulness of minimum fee schedules.
B. Fee Schedules, Price-Fixing, and the Per Se Rule
A violation of section one is generally predicated on the presence
of four factors:
(1) There must be two or more persons acting in concert ("con-
tract, combination . . . or conspiracy");
(2) The act complained of must restrain trade or commerce;
(3) The trade or commerce must be either interstate or foreign;
(4) The restraint must be unreasonable.58
The notion that only unreasonable restraints of trade or commerce vi-
olate section one, first suggested in 1899, 59 was most clearly enun-
ciated by the Supreme Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United States:0°
"[I]t becomes obvious that the criteria to be resorted to in any given
case for the purpose of ascertaining whether violations of the section
have been committed is the rule of reason guided by the established
law . . . ."1 Later decisions"' further refined the unreasonable re-
straint requirement so that such restraints fall into two general cate-
gories: (1) those practices which are viewed as so inherently anti-
competitive that they are condemned outright irrespective of their mo-
tives, purposes, or effects, i.e., per se violations; 63 and (2) those prac-
54. Id. § 18.
55. Id. § 19.
56. See 3 CCH TRADE RE(. RaP. f 9022, at 15,022-23.
57. "Every contract, combination . .. or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal
.... " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
58. 16 J. VON KALTNowsKI § 4.01, at 4-4, 4-5.
59. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). Prior cases
had applied section one without reference to the reasonableness of the alleged restraint.
See United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); United States v. Trans-
Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
60. 221 U.S. 1 (1911). See also United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221
U.S. 106 (1911).
61. 221 U.S. at 62.
62. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
63. "IT]here are certain agreements or practices which because of their perni-
cious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed
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tices which, although suppressive of competition, may have sufficient
social utility to escape condemnation under section one, i.e., restraints
judged by the rule of reason.64
The principal practice to have been held a per se violation of sec-
tion one is price-fixing.65  Price-fixing is an arrangement, either
among competitors (horizontal price-fixing) or between various enti-
ties in the chain of distribution (vertical price-fixing), the purpose of
which is to raise, depress, fix, or stabilize prices.66 It makes no differ-
ence that the resulting prices are reasonable, 7 and no degree of econom-
ic justification can save a price-fixing arrangement. 68 Thus, once price-
fixing has been proven, the only available defenses are that there has
been no restraint of trade or commerce,69 that the trade or commerce
is not interstate, 70 or that the particular defendant is for some other
reason wholly exempt from the antitrust laws."
It seems beyond dispute that an agreement by members of a bar
association to adhere to a minimum fee schedule is a paradigmatic case
of price-fixing. 72  The agreement, of course, need not be verbal, but
may be expressed in the rules and policies of the association. How-
ever, the constituents of many bar associations cannot properly be
deemed to have agreed, even implicitly, to adhere to a fee schedule;
rather, they have only authorized their leaders to promulgate a set of
"suggested" minimum fees for the guidance of association members.73
to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm
they have caused or the business excuse for their use." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
64. See 16 J. VON KAL Nowsri § 4.01, at 4-4.
65. Id. § 6.02[31[a], at 6-93 n.52.
66. "Under the Sherman Act a combination formed for the purpose and with the
effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in
interstate . . . commerce is illegal per se." United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
67. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). The case in-
volved alleged price-fixing by manufacturers who had an eighty-two percent share of
the market for the production of vitreous pottery fixtures. In rejecting the defendants'
contention that their action was reasonable because the resultant prices were reasonable,
the Court stated: "The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and busi-
ness changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow. Once established, it may be
maintained unchanged because of the absence of competition secured by the agreement
of a price reasonable when fixed." Id. at 397.
68. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
69. See Part III infra.
70. See Part II infra.
71. See Part IV infra.
72. See Note, A Critical Analysis of Bar Association Minimum Fee Schedules,
supra note 3, at 973.
73. Such was apparently the situation in the Goldfarb case. See 497 F.2d at 4.
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This variation is unlikely to escape the fatal per se rubric, both be-
cause the portent of sanctions against renegades renders illusory the
element of voluntariness implied by a merely "suggested" schedule74
and because the Supreme Court has held that "suggestions" about ap-
propriate prices are themselves obnoxious:
An agreement, shown either by adherence to a price schedule or by
proof of consensual action fixing the uniform or minimum price, is it-
self illegal under the Sherman Act, no matter what end it was designed
to serve .... And the fact that no penalties are imposed for devia-
tions from the price schedules is not material. . . . Subtle influ-
ences may be just as effective as -the threat or use of formal sanctions
to hold people in line. 75
C. The Publication of Fee Information-A Permissible Alternative
Despite the awesome rigidity of the per se rule, it would seem un-
likely that a court could remain oblivious to the plight of a defendant
with some compelling, non-economic objective achievable only through
a practice incidentally bearing the ugly label "price-fixing." A court
faced with such a defendant might well be more amenable to open-
ing some legal escape hatch found in the interstices of past cases; the
practical attractiveness of each means of escape may well depend upon
one's view of the ends sought to be attained by fee schedules, and the
Stapled inside the front cover of the eighty-seven page Minimum Fee Schedule of
the State Bar of Texas (1968) is a mimeographed "Caveat" dated October 2, 1972,
which states reassuringly: "It should be at all times made clear that minimum fee
schedules constitute suggestions only as to fees that have generally been found reason-
able for particular services ..
74. See note 15 supra.
75. United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 489 (1950).
The case involved a civil suit seeking to enjoin rate-fixing by real estate brokers in the
District of Columbia. While the rates promulgated by the Washington Board were
"suggested" only, the parent National Board's code of ethics stated that brokers should
adhere to the standard rates. Since departure from the locally set rates had not caused
the local board to invoke any sanctions, the district court upheld the rate schedules as
being "nonmandatory." The Supreme Court's response, reversing this position, is quoted
in the text.
While holding the Washington Board culpable, the Court refused to set aside as
clearly erroneous the district court's exoneration of the National Board. The Na-
tional Board's code of ethics provided that schedules of fees "should be observed," id.
at 494, and its by-laws required local boards to adopt and enforce the code of ethics,
under threat of expulsion from the National Board. Besides being deemed insufficient
to subject the National Board to liability, this arrangement was apparently unnecessary
to the Court's finding of a Sherman Act violation in the local board's promulgation of
"suggested" fees. Thus, Real Estate Boards both strengthens the case against local bar
associations' "suggested" fee schedules, and weakens the case that might otherwise have
been made against state bars that have the authority to enforce locally set minimum fees.
See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
1174
MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULES
alternative means available for their attainment. While the advocates of
fee schedules have been able to suggest a panoply of laudatory and bene-
ficent objectives which the schedules are said to further, the goal most
frequently and seriously espoused is that of informing the public and new
members of the bar about prevailing prices for legal services.7" If prohi-
bitions on individual advertising are upheld as necessary to maintain the
decorum befitting a profession, 77 and at the same time consumers are
held to have a first-amendment-flavored "right to know" which cannot
be impeded altogether by state bar associations,7" the argument for sav-
ing fee schedules as an informational device is strengthened. On the
other hand, the case for fee schedules is appealing only to the extent
that other effective methods of conveying fee information suffer from
similar antitrust infirmities. If alternative means are available which
are independently free of antitrust problems, the practical appeal of sus-
taining fee schedules would be much diminished.
At least one such alternative exists: the dissemination of infor-
mation about the fees actually charged for given services by attorneys
in a community. Similar practices in other industries have been up-
held, within limits, in a number of cases dealing with the publishing
of statistical information regarding supply, demand, price, and other
market factors by trade associations. 79 A review of these cases demon-
strates that data gathering and reporting for informational purposes
need not trigger the application of the per se rule and concomitantly
deflates the strongest practical justification for fee schedules, lessening
the temptation to bend the law in order to save the schedules.
Data gathering and reporting activities initially received a chilly
reception from the Supreme Court,"' although the cases left open the
76. Several of the state bar officers who responded to the survey discussed in the
text at notes 8-11 supra expressed a belief that the demise of fee schedules in their states
had hurt consumers' rights.
77. The Justice Department has announced its intention to challenge anti-advertis-
ing provisions on antitrust grounds. L.A. Times, supra note 2, at col. 1.
78. At least one court has recognized the consumers' right to know price informa-
tion. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council v. State Bds. of Pharmacy, 373 F. Supp. 683
(E.D. Va. 1974). Also, the prohibition of the distribution of any price information
might be. attacked on the grounds that it chills the effective exercise of the sixth
amendment right to counsel.
79. For commentary on the case -law dealing with the exchange of information
among competitors under the antitrust laws, see Kefauver, The Legality of Dissemination
of Market Data by Trade Associations: What Does Container Hold?, 57 CORINELL L.
REv. 777 (1972); Supreme Court 1968 Term, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 227 (1969); Note,
Antitrust Implications of the Exchange of Price Information Among Competitors:
The Container Corporation Case, 68 MICH. L. REv. 720 (1970); Comment, Trade
Association Statistics and the Anti-Trust Laws, 18 U. Cm. L. REV. 380 (1951); 54
MINN. L. Rnv. 206 (1969).
80. In American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921),
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possibility that statistical reporting might be a valid activity "[i]n the
absence of a purpose to monopolize or the compulsion that results from
contract or agreement,"81 and this proposition later received express ap-
proval in Maple Flooring Manufacturers Association v. United
States.8 2  Taking its cues from hints in prior cases, the Maple Floor-
ing Association gathered data dealing "exclusively with past and closed
transactions," and maintained at all times the anonymity of specific
buyers and sellers.8 3 Additionally, the statistics gathered were "given
wide publicity,"8 4 a fact which the Supreme Court considered highly
significant:
[T]rade associations . . . which openly and fairly gather and dissemi-
nate information as to the cost of their product, the volume of pro-
duction, the actual price which the product has brought in past trans-
actions . . . and who . . . meet and discuss such information and
statistics without, however, reaching or attempting to reach any agree-
ment or any concerted action with respect to price of production or
restraining competition, do not thereby engage in unlawful restraint of
commerce. 85
Thus, by reporting only past transactions, by reporting only composite
an "open competition" plan of the Hardwood Lumber Manufacturers Association was
struck down as a restraint of trade. Under the plan, members of the Association were
required to file monthly data on stocks, prices, current production, and future produc-
tion to the association's manager of statistics. He compiled weekly and monthly reports
showing sales and production and circulated these reports and a newsletter forecasting
demand to members of the association. Id. at 394-96. The report was distributed to
sellers only. Id. at 411. In holding the plan illegal, the Supreme Court stated:
Genuine competitors do not make daily, weekly and monthly reports of the mi-
nu'est details of the business to their rivals . . .; they do not contract . . . to
submit their books to the discretionary audit and their stocks to the discretion-
ary inspection of their rivals for the purpose of successfully competing with
them. . . . Id. at 410.
A similar restraint was found in United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262
U.S. 371 (1923). In that case, the Linseed Crushers Council adopted a plan whereby
sellers of linseed products were supplied with very detailed information on market condi-
tions. Members were to report "on all matters and conditions within their knowl-
edge affecting the industry," id. at 385, were to supply each other with price lists, and
were to reveal all sales made below "list." Failure to comply with the association's re-
quirements resulted in the forfeiture of a bond and other sanctions. Id. at 382. This
plan was struck down without hesitation as a restraint of trade. Id. at 389. See also
Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914)
(agreement among retail dealers to circulate a list of wholesalers selling direct to con-
sumers held illegal).
81. United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 390 (1923).
82. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
83. Id. at 573.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 586. See also Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936)
(agreement imposing more restraints than necessary to remove abuses in the trade held
unreasonable and illegal).
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figures, and by making the resulting data freely available, the associ-
ation was able to avoid Sherman Act liability. While noting that this
exchange of information might "stabilize prices or limit production
through a better understanding of economic laws,""" the Court was
unwilling to conclude that such activities, without more, were an unlaw-
ful restraint. Earlier cases with contrary holdings were distinguished
on their facts.sr
The law of data dissemination by trade associations thus appeared
settled in favor of the legality of such schemes until the Supreme Court
held in United States v. Container Corp. of America8 that a reciprocal
arrangement among eighteen manufacturers of corrugated contain-
ers for the exchange of the most recent prices charged to a specific cus-
tomer violated section one of the Sherman Act. While the Court recog-
nized that there was no agreement to adhere to a price schedule, the
plan did involve the identification of actual sales to specific custo-
mers. 9 Further, the Court noted:
Price information exchanged in some markets may have no effect on a
truly competitive price. But the corrugated container industry is dom-
inated by relatively few sellers. The product is fungible and the
competition for sales is price. The demand is inelastic. . . . The
exchange of price data tends toward price uniformity. For a lower
price does not mean a larger share of the available business but a
sharing of the existing business at a lower return.90
While the full implication of Container is not yet clear, several
86. 268 U.S. at 584.
87. In American Column & Lumber and American Linseed, see note 80 supra, the
restraint of trade, according to the Court,
arose not from the fact that the defendants had effected a combination to
gather and disseminate information, but from the fact that the court inferred
from the peculiar circumstances of each case that concerted action had re-
sulted, or would necessarily result in tending to arbitrarily lessen production
or increase prices. Id. at 585.
In a companion case, Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588
(1925), the Court upheld data dissemination pertaining to "specific job" contracts on
the ground that the association had proven the necessity and utility of such a scheme
in the cement industry and upon the finding that no coercion was exerted against mem-
bers to utilize the data for other than informational purposes. Id. at 603. The Court
made it clear that information gathering and dissemination was legal, absent a restrain-
ing agreement, since "it fails to show any effect on price and production except such
as would naturally flow from the dissemination of that information in the trade and its
natural influence on individual action." Id. at 606.
88. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
89. Id. at 334. The Court explained that while Cement Manufacturers had upheld
the exchange of prices charged specific customers, it did so only by virtue of the "con-
trolling circumstance" that such information was necessary to prevent fraud in the
unique context of the cement industry. Id. at 335.
90. Id. at 337.
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observations can be made about its application to information ex-
changes within the legal profession. First, the case does not appear
to have created a new per se rule that data gathering and dissemina-
tion which are somehow linked to price stabilization are irrebuttably
presumed to be unlawful.9 1 This conclusion takes its support from
the care with which the Court limited its decision to the specific in-
dustry involved, and its refusal to overrule or even limit Maple Flooring,
which had specifically held that a "natural" stabilization of prices flow-
ing from the exchange of economic data was not a violation of the anti-
trust laws. Thus, Container is consistent with the practice announced
in Maple Flooring of looking at the "peculiar circumstances of each
case." 2  Under this approach, the dissimilarities between the con-
tainer industry and the legal profession are marked. While the Court
found the container industry to be oligopolistic, 93 lawyers would ap-
pear to operate under conditions approaching classical atomistic compe-
tition. While containers are fungible and competition between manu-
facturers is based solely on price,94 the opposite is probably true of legal
services; lawyers are not interchangeable commodities, and the poten-
tial client is likely to be concerned with the skill of the particular at-
torney that he has engaged.
Furthermore, the Container case did not involve a trade associa-
tion, even though all but one of the named defendants were members
of the Fiber Box Association.95 The Association did engage in data
gathering of a generalized nature, not related to specific transactions
and much like the program in Maple Flooring, and the government
was careful to point out in oral argument that it was not challenging
this practice.96 Thus, Container may be seen as limiting prior cases to
the situation in which the data gathering and reporting is done by
an organization not itself involved in marketing the product or serv-
ice involved, perhaps on the theory that direct information exchange
between competitors is too ripe with possibilities for price-fixing to be
tolerated. Under this view of the case, the collection and dissemination
91. See Kefauver, supra note 79, at 785. Cases subsequent to Container do not
appear to have adopted a per se rule. See, e.g., Wall Prods. Co. v. National Gypsum
Co., 326 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Cal. 1971); United States v. FMC Corp., 306 F. Supp.
1106 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
92. 268 U.S. at 585.
93. 393 U.S. at 337.
94. "While containers vary as to dimensions, weight, color and so on, they are
substantially identical, no matter who produces them, when made to particular specifi-
cation." Id. at 336.
95. Kefauver, supra note 79, at 787.
96. BNA ANTrrRusr & TRADE REG. REP., No. 384, Nov. 19, 1968, at A-13.
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of fee information by a bar association would appear permissible if
done consistently with the caveats in Maple Flooring.
The publication of fee information can therefore be safely as-
sumed free from antitrust infirmity, provided:
(1) The information disseminated pertains only to past prac-
tices or transactions;
(2) The information does not reveal details relafing to individ-
ual competitors or particular transactions;
(3) The information is made available to consumers and to all
parties who might need it to compete effectively;
(4) The information is limited to raw statistics-comments or
recommendations are avoided; and
(5) The information is gathered and reported by an association
in order to preclude direct discussions among competitors.97
Since it appears that bar associations can serve their informational ob-
jective effectively by the implementation of such a program, they
should not be heard to argue for the salvation of otherwise infirm mini-
mum fee schedules as indispensible for the attainment of this legitimate
goal.
i. THE JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE
Bar associations which circulate minimum fee schedules are en-
gaged in a form of price-fixing, a per se violation of the Sherman
Act; 8 thus, a plaintiff who can establish antitrust jurisdiction and
demonstrate price-fixing will normally win his case without further
proof. As a result, the alleged price-fixer's first line of defense is to
argue that jurisdiction under the Sherman Act is lacking. 9 A court
will have jurisdiction under the Sherman Act'00 if the plaintiff has
pleaded facts which show a "restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States."''1  The courts have developed two theories upon
which jurisdiction may be founded. 02 The first theory, labeled the
97. See Kefauver, supra note 79, at 777.
98. See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
99. Indeed, if the allegations of price-fixing are true, the only meaningful defense
may be a lack of jurisdiction. See 16 J. VON KALNOWSKi 6 5.01[l], at 5-6 to -7.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
101. The phrase "commerce among the several states" has been interpreted to reach
to the constitutional limits of the commerce clause. United States v. Southeastern Un-
derwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944). Thus, the failure to allege that a practice
restrains interstate commerce is a jurisdictional defect. See 16 J. VON KALINOWSKI
§ 5.01[1].
102. See Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 739
n.3 (9tlt Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954). See generally 16 J. VON KYA-
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"flow of commerce" theory, requires only the allegation of a practice
which restrains the flow of interstate commerce by directly impeding
the interstate movement of goods or services. The other theory, the
"affectation" theory, permits an allegation that a wholly local transac-
tion affects interstate commerce; however, the plaintiff must also dem-
onstrate that the quantitative effect of the local activity on interstate
commerce is substantial. In this section, these two jurisdictional tests
will be explained and related to the fixing of minimum legal fees.
A. Restraints in the Flow of Commerce
Under the "flow of commerce" theory, a plaintiff must show
"it]hat the acts complained of occurred within the flow of interstate
commerce."' 03 Only restraints which directly impede the movement of
interstate goods or services may be reached under this theory of jurisdic-
tion. 10 4  Once such a direct restraint is alleged, jurisdiction will obtain
regardless of the substantiality of the restrained commerce; thus the
"flow of commerce" theory embraces a qualitative jurisdictional stand-
ard. °  Teamsters Local 167 v. United States106 illustrates the sort of
direct restraint which has been held to satisfy the "flow of commerce"
jurisdictional test. It was alleged that union truckers in New York
had refused to haul poultry to purchasers who were resisting a well-
organized conspiracy to eliminate competitive poultry prices. Since the
poultry was received from outside New York, the Supreme Court upheld
Sherman Act jurisdiction, finding that the complaint had alleged a
direct restraint on an item in interstate commerce.10 7
However, the "flow of commerce" theory does not provide jurisdic-
tion when the goods or services allegedly restrained are not actually in
the flow of interstate commerce, even if the restraint affects other
goods or services which are in the flow. °" This restriction on the
scope of the "flow of commerce" theory is typified by the district court
decision in Hotel Phillips, Inc. v. Journeymen Barbers Union."9 In
NOWSKI ch. 5; Eiger, The Commerce Element in Federal Antitrust Litigation, 25 FED.
B.J. 282 (1965).
103. 210 F.2d at 739 n.3.
104. See Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103 (1933); Industrial Ass'n
v. United States, 268 U.S. 64 (1925); United Leather Workers Local 66 v. Herkert, &
Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457 (1924).
105. 210 F.2d at 739 n.3; 16 J. voN K n NowsKr § 5.01[1], at 5-12.
106. 291 U.S. 293 (1934).
107. The Court stated, 'The interference . . . operates substantially and directly to
restrain and burden the untrammeled shipment and movement of the poultry *Jaile un-
questionably it is in interstate commerce." Id. at 297.
108. See 16 J. VON KALINowsmK § 5.01[2], at 5-29 to -34.




that case, owners of hotel and airport barber shops alleged that the
union had conspired to fix minimum prices for barber services and to
enforce a five-day work week. Since many interstate travelers used
these barber shops, the barbers' services were alleged to be in the flow
of commerce. The court rejected this argument and characterized the
services as "purely local" and not part of an interstate flow.110 The
fact that the local restraint might have affected interstate travelers was
held insufficient to invoke Sherman Act jurisdiction under the "flow of
commerce" theory." 1
Whether or not a particular restraint has occurred directly in the
flow of commerce will depend upon the court's decision as to the points
at which the goods or services affected enter and leave the flow of in-
terstate commerce.1 12 Since services are intangible, the question of
whether a service-such as the advice of a lawyer-is actually in the
flow of interstate commerce is conceptually more difficult than that of
whether certain goods are in the flow of commerce. 113  The Supreme
Court addressed the issue of when a service is in the flow of interstate
commerce in United States v. Yellow Cab Co."4 The government
first alleged that the three largest Chicago cab companies had violated
the Sherman Act by agreeing that only one company would contract
with the railroads to transport passengers between railroad stations.
Cab transportation between stations was sold by the railroads as a part
of the price of through tickets. Since many of the railroad passengers.
were in the course of travel between states, the Court stated that the cab
service provided pursuant to the contract with the railroad was "an in-
tegral step in the interstate movement" 5 and upheld jurisdiction
110. Id. at 668-69.
111. Id. at 668.
112. See 16 J. VON KALINOWSKI § 5.01[21, at 5-39 to -66.
113. Another difficulty with the "in the flow" test is that it largely depends "upon
how far the court is willing to expand the conceptual entity known as the flow of com-
merce." Eiger, supra note 102, at 286. Thus, for example, the activities of a retailer
who receives all his goods from wholesalers in the same state may be "in" interstate
commerce if one views his retail outlet as the last link in the chain of distribution from
an out-of-state producer to a local consumer. Yet, by defining the flow of goods to
stop with an in-state wholesaler, one can just as easily view the retailer's activities as
local in nature, having at most only an effect on interstate commerce. See Asheville
Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 507-08 (4th Cir. 1959) (local tobacco
auction held "integral part" of flow of commerce); Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers
Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 740 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
114. 332U.S. 218 (1947).
115. Id. at 229; see Hotel Phillips, Inc. v. Journeymen Barbers Union, 195 F. Supp.
664, 670 (W.D. Mo. 1961), affd, 301 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1962) (per curiam) (stating
in dictum that the service of "red caps" in carrying travelers' bags may be considered
as being performed in the flow of commerce).
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under the "flow of commerce" theory. The Chicago cab companies
were also alleged to have violated the Sherman Act by conspiring to
prevent new operators from entering the cab business, inducing the
city to limit the number of available cab licenses, and acquiring nearly
all the available licenses. These cabs made only intrastate journeys
and no contract with an interstate carrier was involved. The Court
held that the alleged restraint was not in the flow of interstate com-
merce on the ground that passengers who used cabs to begin interstate
trips had not yet entered the stream of commerce and that passen-
gers who used cabs to end their interstate trips had already left the
stream of commerce at the time they used the cabs. 116
Application of the Hotel Phillips and Yellow Cab decisions to
restraints of legal services provides little basis for an argument that
minimum fee schedules directly restrain a service which is in the flow
of interstate commerce. Legal services are generally local in nature
and can hardly be characterized as an integral part of interstate move-
ment as were the contract cab services in Yellow Cab. Although legal
fees may affect certain elements of interstate movement, Hotel Phil-
lips makes it clear that such an indirect restraint will not sustain juris-
diction under the "flow of commerce" theory. The Goldfarb court did
not even find it necessary to analyze whether Virginia lawyers provided
services in the flow of commerce. It merely noted that it was "undis-
puted that the activities of the [county bar] Association and its mem-
bers were carried on wholly within the State of Virginia."'91 7 Never-
theless, the assumption that legal services are not in the flow of com-
merce is probably a sound one. However, the Justice Department
takes a contrary view. In a complaint filed against the Oregon State
Bar," 8 it alleged that
legal services provided by members of OSB [Oregon State Bar] in-
volve and affect individuals, corporations, and other business entities
throughout the United States. These legal services facilitate, direct,
and shape the conduct of interstate and international business and
contribute directly to -the flow of persons, money, goods, and services
into and out of the state of Oregon."19
116. The Court stated that "interstate commerce is an intensely practical concept,"
332 U.S. 231, and that "the common understanding is that a traveler intending to make
an interstate rail journey begins his interstate movement when he boards the train at the
station and that his journey ends when he disembarks at the station in the city of his
destination." Id. The Court also found that the second alleged conspiracy had no
"effect" on interstate commerce. See note 136 infra.
117. 497 F.2d at 16.
118. Complaint in United States v. Oregon State Bar, Civil No. 74-362 (D. Ore.,




The government went on to urge that the activities of the state bar and
its members are "within the flow of interstate commerce." While it
is doubtful whether the government can in fact meet the narrow stand-
ards of the "flow of commerce" theory of jurisdiction, the Justice De-
partment and other plaintiffs are not limited to this theory and may
attempt to establish jurisdiction under the "affectation" test.
B. Affecting the Flow of Commerce
In Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar
Co.120 the Supreme Court broadened the basis for obtaining jurisdic-
tion under the Sherman Act. The defendants, California sugar re-
finers, had conspired to pay a uniform price for sugar beeets grown by
local farmers; 121 the beets were refined into sugar which was sold
throughout the United States. 2 ' Under prior decisions, the complain-
ing farmers could not have established jurisdiction, since the beets,
whose sale was restrained, were processed into a "different" commod-
ity, sugar, before entering the flow of commerce. 123  But the Court
rejected these precedents and laid the foundation for an expansive "af-
fectation" test of jurisdiction.
[T]he inquiry whether the restraint occurs in one phase or another,
interstate or intrastate, of the total economic process is now merely a
preliminary step, except for those situations in which no aspect of or
substantial effect upon interstate commerce can be found in the sum
of the facts presented. For, given a restraint of the type forbidden by
the Act, though arising in the course of intrastate or local activities,
and a showing of actual or threatened effect upon interstate com-
merce, the vital question becomes whether the effect is sufficiently sub-
stantial and adverse to Congress' paramount policy declared in the
Act's terms to constitute a forbidden consequence.' 24  ".
The Ninth Circuit further refined the "affectation" test in the
leading case of Las Vegas Merchants Plumbers Association v. United
States. 125 This case dealt with an alleged conspiracy among Nevada
plumbing contractors to fix prices through the use of an estimating
bureau which established a price on each job which had been set for
bids and allocated the work among the contractors. 26  Since "practi-
120. 334 U.S. 219 (1948).
121. Id. at 221.
122. Id. at 225.
123. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1894), an early Sherman
Act case having facts very similar to Mandeville.
124. 334 U.S. at 234 (emphasis added).
125. 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
126. Id. at 743.
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cally all" plumbing and heating supplies used in plumbing installations
in Nevada were shipped into the state from California and other
places, 2 7 the indictment alleged that the flow of goods into Nevada
was restrained by the allocation system which forced contract prices to
an artificial level. Relying on Mandeville, the court held the indict-
ment sufficient for federal jurisdictional purposes, not because the al-
leged restraint was "in the flow" of commerce, but because it "sub-
stantially affected" interstate commerce in heating and plumbing sup-
plies. 28
While Mandeville and later Supreme Court opinions12  clearly
sanction the Ninth Circuit's expansive jurisdictional approach in Las
Vegas Plumbers, the cases provide no easy rules for determining when
a wholly local activity "substantially affects" trade among the states.
It is clear, however, that once an alleged restraint has been determined
to fall outside the "flow of commerce," the first step in ascertaining
Sherman Act applicability under the "affectation" theory must be a
quantitative one.130 The court must examine the specific economic
data surrounding the transaction to decide whether the commerce al-
legedly affected by the restraint is "substantial." One court has sug-
gested:
The key question in the case then is whether these clear "ef-
fects" on interstate commerce, caused by the activities alleged, are
"substantial" enough to confer jurisdiction. Because this is an issue
which involves many variables, no single, satisfactory test emerges
from the precedent. When courts do speak in terms of a test, -the
formulations used are, of necessity, so broad and generalized that in-
stead of providing a guide to the solution of the problem they do no
more than restate the issue.' 3'
The courts have not clearly indicated whether the effect should be
measured in terms of some percentage of total interstate business af-
fected, or whether an absolute dollar amount should be used as a cut-
off, nor is it clear how broad a class of interstate transactions should
be examined in search of the requisite effect.132  Because the "affecta-
127. Id. at 738.
128. Id. at 743.
129. See United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460 (1949).
130. See Las Vegas Merchants Plumbers Ass'n v. United States, 210 F.2d 732, 742.
43 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954).
131. Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48, 51 (3d Cir. 1973). This court went
on to observe that "the precedent in this area is unlikely to dictate the outcome in
any given case. Instead, it is more likely to communicate a general sense as to how
much of an impact local activities must have upon interstate commerce before they
confer jurisdiction." Id.
132. Suppose a court following the substantiality test requires that a certain propor-
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tion" theory is so imprecise, it has been susceptible to manipulation by
the courts to support any conclusion that they want to reach, and some
courts have gone so far as to abandon the quantitative substantiality
test suggested by Mandeville in favor of an entirely different, qualitative
test.
C. The "Dominant Purpose" Rationale
Some courts have adopted a "dominant purpose" test under which
they attempt to determine whether a defendant engaging in an alleged
restraint affecting commerce intended to restrain trade among the
states. A frequently cited-and perhaps the clearest-expression of
this qualitative purpose-oriented test is found in Spears Free Clinic &
Hospital for Poor Children v. Cleere.13 3  The plaintiffs in Spears
were chiropractors who challenged Colorado licensing procedures for
the practice of medicine and alleged a conspiracy among medical doc-
tors to maintain monopolistic control over the treatment of disease by
restraining competition from chiropractors. Using the language of
"substantiality," the court nevertheless resorted to a different approach
to defeat jurisdiction:
Here, the purpose and object of the conspiracy and of the means
adopted to effectuate it, were to restrain the practice of chiropractic
and to allocate to the medical profession the practice of the healing
arts in Colorado. It is this exclusively local aim and not the fortui-
tous and incidental effect upon interstate and foreign commerce
which gives character to the conspiracy. The effect upon interstate
and foreign commerce was fortuitous and remote and not direct and
substantial.' 34
This "dominant purpose" rationale seems tailor-made as a jurisdictional
tion of interstate business be shown to have been affected by the challenged activity
in order to uphold jurisdiction. Further suppose that the challenged activity is the
setting of minimum fees for a broad range of legal services. The plaintiffs present
evidence showing that a large amount of interstate real estate business is affected by
the setting of minimum fees for title examinations. No evidence is presented showing
any effect on any other interstate business. Should the effect be measured as a propor-
tion of the real estate business, presumably "substantial," or as a proportion of all inter-
state business which might conceivably have been influenced by the price of legal
services, presumably "insubstantial"? If the latter approach is chosen, should the court
nevertheless uphold jurisdiction as to that portion of a minimum fee schedule which
sets the fees for title examinations, thereby "severing" the schedule? See notes 171-80
infra and accompanying text.
133. 197 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1952).
134. Id. at 128. See Elizabeth Hosp., Inc. v. Richardson, 269 F.2d 167, 170 (8th
Cir. 1959); Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266, 268 (8th Cir.
1957). These cases follow Spears to hold that hospital activities do not have the requi-
site effect on interstate commerce.
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shield for fee schedules promulgated by bar associations, and the Gold-
farb court cited Spears and made use of its rationale.13 5
In Goldfarb, the Fourth Circuit emphasized that "members of
the [county bar] Association were engaged in the general practice of
law and did not solicit out-of-state business." 6  This element-the
absence of intent to seek interstate business-permitted the court to
classify as a "fortuitous circumstance" the fact that the plaintiffs had
used the services of Virginia attorneys "to secure a loan from a com-
pany engaged in interstate transactions."'3  Reiterating its finding that
the bar association did not seek to restrain interstate commerce, the
135. 497 F.2d at 16 n.49. The court cited Spears for the proposition that a business
whose customers may cross state lines to purchase a product or service is not necessarily
engaged in interstate commerce.
136. Id. at 18.
The Goldfarb district court had found the requisite effect on interstate commerce
in the fact that a "significant portion of funds furnished for the purchasing of homes
in Fairfax County comes from without the State of Virginia." 355 F. Supp. at 494.
The court based this finding on information supplied by the plaintiffs, who had sampled
the recorded mortgage transactions in Fairfax County for 1970 and 1971. The study
indicated that more than half the total mortgage funds recorded in the county-
$75,615,096 of $136,281,120 in the sample-came from outside Virginia. Mortgages
under $100,000-those more likely to be used for residential purposes-were more than
40 percent out-of-state. Id. at 497. Since virtually all lenders required a title examina-
tion and title insurance which was available only through licensed Virginia attorneys,
the district court held that artificial price restraints on legal services did have the requi-
site effect on interstate commerce to meet the jurisdictional requirement. Id. at 494.
In addition, the lower court found support for its determination in the fact "that a
large percentage of persons who live in Fairfax County work outside of Virginia" and
that federal agencies guaranteed "significant amounts of loans on Fairfax County real
estate." Id.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed. 497 F.2d at 16. The court made no reference to
federal loan guarantees, and quickly dispensed with the fact that many Fairfax County
homeowners are commuters as "totally irrelevant." Id. Under the court's analysis, only
the finding of "significant" out-of-state mortgage funds presented a possible basis for
jurisdiction; and according to the court, plaintiffs did not show the requisite "direct
and substantial" effect on the interstate flow of mortgages. The court pointed out that
"[t]he fact that a service is occasionally utilized to facilitate interstate activities does
not subject the one providing the service to the proscriptions of the Sherman Act."
Id. at 17, citing United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
In Yellow Cab, the Supreme Court had held that an alleged conspiracy to control
taxicab service in Chicago, which was used by travelers going from their homes or
hotels to train stations, had only an "incidental" effect on interstate commerce. The
Court emphasized in ruling against jurisdiction that "the traveler has complete freedom
to arrive at or leave the station by taxicab, trolley, bus . . . or various other means
of conveyance." Id. at 232. The Goldfarb court did not examine the contrast between
this "freedom" and the mandatory title services of the real estate transaction.
However, the Yellow Cab Court did hold that a conspiracy to limit competition
in special contracts for taxi transportation of rail passengers between train stations met
the in-the-flow jurisdictional test. See text accompanying notes 114-16 supra.
137. 497 F.2d at 18.
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court was able to designate services included in the minimum fee
schedule as "wholly local" and unreachable under the federal antitrust
statutes:
We are constrained to hold that the Association sought to regulate
only "general local services." The fact that those services are occa-
sionally used by persons who are simultaneously engaged in an an-
cillary interstate transaction to facilitate the conduct of that transac-
tion is merely "incidental"; this does -not justify federal regulation of
competitive restraints upon a business which is "wholly local" in char-
acter.'38
Thus, by focusing on the intent of the defendant in instituting the
challenged activity, the court ignored the data which had influenced the
district court to reach an opposite conclusion. 39
While the dominant purpose approach is supported by some older
Supreme Court decisions, 140 the Court has more recently rejected the
premise upon which it is based. In United States v. Employing Plas-
terers Association'4' and Burke v. Ford,142 the Court upheld jurisdic-
tion over alleged conspiracies that were "directed toward controlling
138. Id.
139. See note 136 supra. The Goldfarb court may have also erred by injecting ele-
ments of the "rule of reason" into its jurisdictional determination. The error was mani-
fested by the citation of two prior Fourth Circuit cases, both dealing with the "rule
of reason" issue: Savon Gas Stations Number Six, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 309 F.2d 306
(4th Cir. 1962); Lawson v. Woodmere, Inc., 217 F.2d 148 (4th Cir. 1954). 497 F.2d
at 18. The "rule of reason" holds essentially that the Sherman Act applies only to
unreasonable restraints of trade. See notes 60-64 supra and accompanying text. A
"rule of reason" examination necessarily involves an inquiry into the purpose of a re-
straint to see whether or not it is "reasonable" under the circumstances. But "reason-
ableness" is not a jurisdictional question and should not be an element in measuring
impact on commerce.
Even if the injection of the "reasonableness" issue into the jurisdictional determina-
tion could be justified conceptually, the use of a "reasonableness" test of jurisdiction
runs head-on into the per se rule when price-fixing is alleged. See notes 65-68 supra
and accompanying text. If the finding of a per se violation forecloses all inquiry into
the reasonableness of a practice for the purpose of determining whether it constitutes
a "restraint," such a finding logically should also prohibit resort to a reasonableness
test for jurisdictional purposes.
140. In Industrial Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 64 (1925), the Court found no
antitrust jurisdiction where "interference with interstate trade was neither desired nor
intended," id. at 77, and where it was "not within the design of appellants, but purely
incidental to the accomplishment of a different purpose," id. at 80. Two years earlier,
in 1922, the Court had found a "full local motive for the conspiracy" enough to defeat
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. UMW v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344, 411
(1922); see Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 107-08 (1933); United
Leather Workers Local 66 v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U.S. 457, 471 (1924).
141. 347 U.S. 186 (1954).
142. 389 U.S. 320 (1967) (per curiam).
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a purely intrastate market for goods or services." 143  The alleged re-
straint in Employing Plasterers was a conspiracy among plasterers'
unions to dictate price and other terms to plastering contractors. Al-
though the aim of the conspiracy was plainly local in that it sought to
affect only dealings with Chicago contractors, the Court ignored the
intrastate purpose in ascertaining that there was a sufficient effect on
interstate movement of plastering materials into Illinois to sustain juris-
diction.144 Burke involved horizontal territorial divisions among liq-
uor wholesalers in Oklahoma, again a conspiracy directed solely at in-
state commerce. This time the Court was able to uphold Sherman Act
jurisdiction easily in a per curiam opinion. 45 Furthermore, the Third
Circuit, in a well-reasoned opinion relying on Employing Plasterers
and Burke, has flatly rejected the dominant purpose test. In the 1973
case of Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 46 the court held that an al-
leged restraint of trade in hospital services in the metropolitan Phila-
delphia area did have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, ex-
pressly rejecting the dominant purpose reasoning of Spears as "not in
accord with the major relevant decisions which have been handed
down" since it was decided. 4 7
The dominant purpose test has the additional disadvantage of re-
lying too much on "conclusory phrases" which can offer "little guid-
ance" to courts in their efforts to deal with jurisdictional questions in
an antitrust context.' 48 Once the intent of the defendant has been
shown to be "regulation" of local services, any impact on commerce
among the states necessarily would be merely "incidental" or "fortui-
tous" and thus insubstantial. Furthermore, it is puzzling how the in-
tent of an antitrust defendant can be relevant to the interstate effect of
his actions, which seemingly would have the same commercial impact
even if accidental. Thus, a bar association would be imprudent to
place much confidence in dominant purpose analysis as a jurisdictional
143. Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48, 52 (3d Cir. 1973) (relying upon
Employing Plasterers and Burke).
144. 347 U.S. at 189.
145. 389 U.S. 320 (1967). The results in Employing Plasterers and Burke had
been foreshadowed by the Court even before Spears was decided:
The fact that the ultimate object of the conspiracy charged was the fixing or
maintenance of local retail prices, does not of itself remove it from the scope
of the Sherman Act; retail outlets have ordinarily been the object of illegal
price maintenance. Whatever was the ultimate object of this conspiracy, the
means adopted for its accomplishment reached beyond the boundaries of Colo-
rado. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293. 298 (1945)
(emphasis added).
146. 490 F.2d 48 (3d Cir. 1973).
147. Id. at 52.
148. Krotinger, The Essentially Local Doctrine and Section 1 of the Sherman Act,
15 W. Rs. L. REV. 66, 74 (1968).
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shield against application of the Sherman Act. The dominant purpose
approach is subject to such serious criticism that it seems unlikely many
courts will accept it.
D. Interstate Aspects of Professional Services
A bar association faced with a federal antitrust suit could argue
against Sherman Act jurisdiction by analogy to cases involving the med-
ical profession; until recently, courts have been unwilling to find that
the activities of the medical profession have a substantial effect on inter-
state commerce. On the other hand, to the extent that the lawyers' ac-
tivities restrain real estate transactions, several cases dealing with the
real estate business might be applicable. These cases are less consist-
ent than those involving the medical profession and suggest that there
is no uniform rule which would protect activities characterized as "pro-
fessional" from antitrust regulation.
Several cases have minimized the impact of doctors' activities on
interstate commerce. For example, the Supreme Court in United
States v. Oregon State Medical Society149 affirmed as "not clearly errone-
ous" the district court's finding that the activities of doctor-sponsored
prepaid medical plans were wholly intrastate.'50 The Court explained
that the doctor-sponsored plans' payments to out-of-state doctors and
hospitals were "few, sporadic, and incidental,"'' and therefore did not
cause the activities to be interstate commerce. The Court also distin-
guished American Medical Association v. United States,52 a case in-
volving doctors in the District of Columbia, on the basis that interstate
commerce is not necessary for prosecution under section three of the
Sherman Act,153 the provision applicable to restraints of trade in the
District of Columbia. Thus, American Medical Association did "not
stand for the proposition that furnishing of prepaid medical care on a
local plane is interstate commerce."' 54 The Tenth Circuit reached a like
conclusion in a case similar to Spears'55 when a "naturopathic" physician
challenged, New Mexico's "Basic Science Law."'I5  Dealing with the
149. 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
150. Id. at 338.
151. Id. at 339.
152. 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).
154. 343 U.S. at 339.
155. See notes 133-34 supra and accompanying text.
156. Polhemus v. American Medical Ass'n, 145 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1944). Plaintiff
alleged that state and local medical societies, along with the American Medical Associa-
tion had conspired to procure passage of legislation which effectively barred him from
medical practice, in violation of the Sherman Act.
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jurisdictional issue in a summary manner, the court held: "[A]ll the
transactions relate to the practice of such arts wholly within the state
of New Mexico. Plaintiff's entire practice is confined to the state of
New Mexcio. . . . Under no circumstances can such a practice be con-
sidered commerce or affecting commerce within the meaning of the
[Sherman] Act."'15 7  These decisions, along with lower federal court
holdings following them,1 8 do provide a solid base for asserting that
medical services do not have a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.
However, Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross'59 showed that proper appli-
cation of the quantitative "affectation" test to a given factual situation
can result in a finding of substantial impact on commerce even in the
field of medical services.1 60 Furthermore, if that case is read as requir-
ing a comprehensive factual inquiry into any allegation of illegal re-
straints by professionals, then the courts need to examine carefully the
activities of lawyers who have allegedly restrained trade. If such a
factual analysis is undertaken, cases discussing Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion over real estate transactions may prove illuminating because law-
yers play a role in many of these transactions. Certainly, title searches
-the practice at issue in Goldfarb- -' 6 1 are an integral part of many
real property transactions.
Unfortunately, case law concerning real estate transactions is in-
consistent. The Sixth Circuit, in cases three years apart, reached op-
posite conclusions on similar real estate questions. In Bratcher v. Ak-
ron Board of Realtors,62 the court sustained antitrust jurisdiction over
a claim by blacks alleging a conspiracy by Ohio realtors to prevent them
from purchasing residences in all-white neighborhoods. But in Marston
v. Ann Arbor Property Managers Association,'63 the Sherman Act was
held inapplicable to the apartment rental business in a university com-
munity. The court indicated in Marston that the alleged control of the
157. Id. at 359.
158. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 1973-1 Trade Cas. j
74,428 (E.D.N.C. 1973); Robinson v. Lull, 145 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
159. 490 F.2d48 (3d Cir. 1973).
160. The Doctors court was satisfied that Doctors, Inc. had established jurisdiction
by making sufficient factual allegations concerning Blue Cross' and the Hospital Advi-
sory Committee's effect upon the flow of out-of-state supplies to Philadelphia hospitals.
Id. at 51.
161. See 497 F.2d at 4.
162. 381 F.2d 723 (6th Cir. 1967) (per curiam). This one page opinion is unin-
structive. The court does not indicate whether it is finding jurisdiction based on an
in-the-flow theory or a substantial-effect-upon theory.
163. 422 F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
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Ann Arbor rental market affected only "local commerce," with no
"substantial. 
. . effect on interstate commerce."'16 4
Alleged antitrust violations by mortgage lending institutions also
have produced differing results on the jurisdictional issue. In Brett v.
First Federal Savings & Loan Association,165 the Fifth Circuit upheld
jurisdiction 168 under the Sherman Act when homeowners sued their
mortgagees and savings and loan associations for allegedly conspiring
to enforce unlawful "due on sale" clauses in deeds of trust and for re-
fusing to allow sale of mortgaged property unless purchasers agreed to
renegotiate interest rates.16 7  An opposite result was reached in
United States v. Chicago Mortgage Bankers Association,6 ' where a
district court held that an alleged antitrust violation by mortgage bank-
ers dealing in real estate loans had no "substantial. . . effect on inter-
state trade or commerce .... 169
The disparate results in these cases, which involved the same es-
sential services, suggest that the question of whether the title searches
164. Id. at 837. In an earlier case, Cotillion Club, Inc. v. Detroit Real Estate Bd.,
303 F. Supp. 850 (E.D. Mich. 1964), the district court reached the same conclusion
when presented with an antitrust claim by blacks against a real estate board and two
real estate associations. Speaking about the real estate transactions, the court said, "[e]x-
cept for incidentals, the activities are local and intrastate. And significantly, no case
has been cited or found which holds that dealing in real estate is commerce among
the states." Id. at 854.
However, in later cases, district courts in Illinois and Maryland found real estate
commission schedules had a sufficient impact on commerce to meet the jurisdictional
requisites. Mazur v. Behrens, 1974-1 Trade Cas. V 75,070 (N.D. Ill. 1972); United
States v. Prince George's County Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 1971 Trade Cas. 73,393 (D.
Md. 1970). In Mazur, the district court found it "almost self-evident that the increase
of a real estate commission from 6% to 7% . . . necessarily burdens the movement
of persons and their effects from state to state." 1974-1 Trade Cas. at 96,788.
165. 461 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1972).
166. The court suggested that the homeowners might establish jurisdiction based on
at least three adverse effects that the defendants' activities allegedly had upon interstate
commerce:
(1) that interstate movement is unreasonably obstructed by agreements re-
stricting the transfer of equity in real property; (2) that one or more of de-
fendants are subsidiaries of multi-state associations; and (3) that defendants'
activities affect rental costs of lessees who are only temporarily in the state.
Id. at 1157.
167. Other courts have also been able to find an effect upon commerce where real
estate loans were involved. In Stavrides v. Mellon Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 353 F.
Supp. 1072 (W.D. Pa.), af 'd, 487 F.2d 953 (3d Cir. 1973), a federal district court
based its refusal to dismiss an antitrust claim on the assumption that local real estate
loans increase a lending institution's assets and then "make their way through the normal
course of the banking business into interstate commerce." Id. at 1075; see Kinee v.
Abraham Lincoln Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 1974-1 Trade Cas. 1 74,927 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
where the court found "the magnitude of the mortgage business in Eastern Pennsylvania
must necessarily have impact on inter-state commerce. . . " id. at 96,153.
168. 123 F. Supp. 251 (N.D. Ill. 1954).
169. Id. at 256.
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in Goldfarb had a substantial impact on the flow of commerce is a
close one. The district court, after an extensive factual analysis, con-
cluded that they did, 170 and the law is too unsettled to say that the
lower court's decision was incorrect. The Fourth Circuit avoided this
factual inquiry by examining the purpose of the restraint and reached
a contrary result. The better-reasoned and more recent case law
dealing with the medical profession suggests that the Goldfarb court
erred in failing at least to examine the data which the trial court found
dispositive, although admittedly other medical-antitrust cases have
adopted a conclusory approach to the jurisdictional issue similar to that
adopted in Goldfarb.
E. The Question of Severability
If a court finds that a legal fee schedule violates the Sherman
Act, a bar association might try to sever the offending part in order
to save the rest of the schedule. This division might be made by divid-
ing legal services into interstate and intrastate segments. The concept
of severability has frequently been applied in antitrust cases where a
product is sold both in interstate and local trade. When this doctrine
is applied, its effect is to allow a seller to continue to restrain trade for
those transactions which he can label "intrastate." The severability
concept was developed in 1899 when the Supreme Court modified a
decree of the Sixth Circuit because the lower court's order would have
reached intrastate as well as interstate activity. The Court held in
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States171 that Congress "does not
acquire any jurisdiction over that part of a combination or agreement
which relates to commerce wholly within a State, by reason of the fact
that the combination also covers and regulates commerce which is inter-
state.1 172  The circuit court had issued a decree prohibiting a price-
fixing scheme among six steel pipe producers.17 3 The Supreme Court
upheld the order, but limited its application to interstate sales, leav-
ing the scheme intact with regard to sales by each producer within the
state of manufacture.17 4  In 1930, the Ninth Circuit reiterated the
proposition that intrastate and interstate aspects of a business must be
treated separately:
Business may be and usually is composed of both intrastate and in-
terstate operations. The fact that these operations are conducted by a
170. See note 136 supra.
171. 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
172. Id. at 247.
173. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898).
174. 175 U.S. at 247.
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single corporation or individual does not make the entire business so
conducted either interstate commerce, or intrastate commerce. The
character of the business is determined by the particular transactions
involved and the respective jurisdiction of the federal and state gov-
ernments is determined thereby.175
Thus, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts have been consistent
in their recognition that activities of a business or individual are sever-
able for purposes of determining applicability of federal antitrust provi-
sions.
The severability cases, however, all dealt with alleged restraints
"in the flow" of commerce; the courts have not carefully examined how
the concept should function where a "substantial effect" is the jurisdic-
tional basis. If the "affectation" approach indeed does expand the
reach of the Sherman Act, the statute may now reach activity which
would have been severable under the "flow" test. Careful scrutiny of
the "affectation" test reveals that it does erode some of the jurisdic-
tional defenses afforded defendants by severability. The early cases
make it manifestly clear that activities brought under the Sherman Act
because they are in the flow of commerce can and must be segre-
gated from activities of the same type which do not enter the stream
of interstate commerce. But the substantiality test brings each of an
entire class of activities within the scope of the Sherman Act if that
class, considered as a whole, has the requisite effect on commerce.
Thus, if a class of sales or services substantially affects commerce, then
any restraint on those sales or services is illegal. A court may be un-
able to segregate those activities which have a "substantial" effect from
those which do not, because the test affords no such precision and be-
cause jurisdiction is expanded to reach the entire class.1 7
The result, as applied to minimum fee schedules, might mean
that a bar association could not take advantage of the severability doc-
trine to salvage portions of a fee schedule setting prices for services
with a de minimis impact on interstate commerce; the whole schedule
would fall if the requisite effect was found with respect to the schedule
175. Foster & Kleiser Co. v. Special Site Sign Co., 85 F.2d 742, 753 (9th Cir. 1936);
see United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 111 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (sever-
ability acknowledged in a Clayton Act suit).
176. "Substantiality," regardless of the court's precise definition of the term, would
have no meaning in relation to the total activity of a defendant or group of defendants
if each class of challenged activity could be severed into two distinct subclassifications.
By simply segregating any part of the challenged activity which had no visible effect
on commerce, the court could quickly define a class consisting only of specific transac-




as a whole.177 The items in the minimum fee schedules might still be
severed, however, if the court were to narrow its definition of the class
of activities which has a substantial effect in any given case. In Gold-
farb, for example, the court might have defined the class as either title
searches or as legal services in general. Use of the more general classi-
fication, as the Justice Department implicitly urges, 178 would seem to
eliminate severability as a useful tool for defendant bar associations.
But a narrower classification would permit the bar associations to ar-
gue that other legal activities, essentially different "products," should
be severed from title searches for jurisdictional purposes.
The Goldfarb court felt "some aspects of the practice of law are
uniquely intrastate," citing as examples state criminal prosecutions and
trials of criminal cases.17 9 It is indeed difficult to discover an inter-
state impact resulting from an attorney's defense of a typical criminal
case involving no theft of interstate goods. Similarly, a divorce action,
assuming the absence of securities or other interstate property in the
settlement, would have no discernible interstate effect. Preparation of
wills, involving no property in another state, like representation in di-
vorce cases, is a service frequently listed on fee schedules, and, like
divorces, normally would not touch on interstate commerce. Advice on
state income tax matters and civil commitment representations are
other services for which one is hard-pressed to discover an impact on
commerce among the states.' 80 Thus, much of the business of the
typical general practitioner might be severed from those legal activities
that affect commerce, and he could continue to enjoy the benefits of a
fee schedule which would cover most of his work. Other attorneys
whose practice is more specialized and more clearly exerts an inter-
state impact are less likely to rely on fee schedules to provide a sup-
port for their income, and for them the practical effect of discarding the
fee schedule may therefore be limited.
Despite the potential utility of severability, the Fourth Circuit did
not examine the issue in Goldfarb, concluding that a fee schedule must
be treated as an integral unit.18' While the confusion brought about by
the interaction of the severability doctrine and "affectation" test leaves
177. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
178. Complaint in United States v. Oregon State Bar, Civil No. 74-362 (D. Ore.,
filed May 9, 1974).
179. 497 F.2d at 17 & n.52.
180. Another factor which may play a key role in the jurisdictional determination
is geography. The quantitative impact of legal services on interstate trade will be greater
in a multi-state metropolitan area like Washington, New York, or St. Louis than in
a small town in central Texas.
181, 497 F.2d at 17 n.52,
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the severability of fee schedules in doubt, it would seem that an analy-
sis based on the concept of severability and recognizing each item on
the schedule as a separate "product" might well have led to the result
that the Goldfarb court wanted to reach, while allowing the court to
maintain a greater degree of intellectual integrity.
III. THE "LEARNED PROFESSION" AND "NON-
COMMERCIAL PURPOSE" EXEMPTIONS
The activities of bar associations in promulgating minimum fee
schedules may be exempt from the antitrust laws, even though they
are interstate in nature, under the so-called "learned profession" doc-
trine182 or, alternatively, under the theory that the fee schedules are
valid because they 'have an essentially "noncommercial" purpose. 183
Careful consideration of the cases said to support these two exemp-
tions and other cases from related areas compels the conclusion that
neither exemption can properly be used today to shield bar association
fee schedules.
A. The "Learned Profession" Exemption M'4
No federal statute has ever expressly exempted the "learned pro-
182. See Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1957).
But see United States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 310 U.S. 644 (1940).
183. See Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges
and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965
(1970).
184. No court that has applied the "learned profession" exemption has enumerated
the occupations included within its scope. For the purposes of this section it will be
assumed that, at the least, medicine and law are "learned professions."
For varying treatments of the "learned profession" exemption, see 16F J. VON KALI-
NOWSKI §§ 49.01-.02; Coleman, The Learned Professions, 33 ABA ANTrrusr L.J. 48
(1967).
Recently, the New York Court of Appeals held In re Estate of Freeman, 34
N.Y.2d 1, 311 N.E.2d 480, 355 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1974), that the Donnelly Act, N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAw §§ 340 et seq. (McKinney 1968), New York's antitrust law, did not
apply to the practice of law. The court explained that "the issue, as it would be under
Federal antitrust law, is whether the legal profession is a business or trade." 34 N.Y.2d
at 7, 311 N.E.2d at 483, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 339. The court answered this question
negatively, saying, "The history and purpose of the legal profession and the professional
associations supports the view that the profession is not included within the terms 'busi-
ness or trade' as used in section 340 of the General Business Law." Id. at 8, 311
N.E.2d at 483, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 340. The court added that if the legislature wanted
to reach fee schedules, it could use a specific statute or the "court rules and controls
within the existing scheme for judicial oversight of the Bar" which, in the court's view,
would be more expeditious, effective, and direct than the "comparatively clumsy device
of antitrust law enforcement." Id. at 9, 311 N.E.2d at 484, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 340.
Of course, a state court acting to construe a state antitrust law in harmony with
a state-approved minimum fee schedule has greater latitude than a federal court faced
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fessions" from the scope of the federal antitrust laws. The basis of the
supposed exemption is the concept that the practice of such profes-
sions does not constitute "trade or commerce" within the meaning of
the Sherman Act. Proponents of the exemption attempt to draw a neg-
ative inference from the language of the Sherman Act: since the Act
specifically mentions "trade or commerce," any activity which is not
"trade or commerce" was not intended to fall within the scope of the
Act. The implication of this position is that either the Sherman Act
established a jurisdictional definition less inclusive than the commerce
clause of the Constitution, or that professional activities are not the
sort of "commerce" constitutionally necessary for the exercise of fed-
eral jurisdiction. While the Fourth Circuit in Goldfarb did not hold
that persons practicing the learned professions were exempt from all
prosecution under the Sherman Act,8 5 it did hold that when the ac-
tivity allegedly restrained-in that case, the practice of law---did not
constitute "trade or commerce," there could be no violation of the
Sherman Act. The proposition that the practice of law is exempt from
the Sherman Act because it does not constitute "trade or commerce"
within the meaning of the Act is drawn from two distinct lines of
cases, one beginning with Federal Baseball Club v. National League
of Baseball Clubs""0 and the other with FTC v. Raladam Co. s7
B. Federal Baseball and Its Progeny
Federal Baseball is the case most often cited to support the con-
tention that the Sherman Act was meant to apply only to "trade or com-
merce" and that in choosing those words Congress intended to exempt
certain activities from the reach of the measure. In holding that base-
ball was not "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman
Act, the Court said that "the [baseball] exhibition, although made for
money, would not be called trade or commerce in the commonly ac-
cepted use of those words. As it is put by the defendants, personal
effort, not related to production, is not a subject of commerce." '
with a conflict between federal and state rules. In the latter case, harmonization may
be precluded by the supremacy clause.
185. In Goldfarb, it was alleged that the bar association fee schedule restrained not
only the practice of law but also the interstate housing financing market. It is clear
that restraint of the housing financing market would not qualify for the "learned profes-
sion" exemption. See American Medical Ass'n. v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943).
Thus, the Goldfarb court was forced to excuse the housing restraint on the ground that
no interstate commerce was affected. 497 F.2d at 15-19.
186. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
187. 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
188. 259 U.S. at 209. In offering illustrations to support its position, the Court re-
ferred to the legal profession: "[A] firm of lawyers sending out a member to argue
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The holding in the case led to the inference that Congress had in-
tended to exclude certain activities, including baseball, from the scope
of the Sherman Act by establishing the requirement that activities reg-
ulated must be "trade or commerce."
Those who read the case to mean that the regulated activity must
be a form of "trade or commerce" that is defined more narrowly than
"commerce"' as it is used in the Constitution l 9 fail to consider subse-
quent statements by the Court that
[a] consideration of the history of the period immediately preceding
and accompanying the passage of the Sherman Act and of the mis-
chief to be remedied, as well as the general trend of the debate in both
houses, sanctions the conclusion hat Congress meant to deal com-
prehensively and 'effectively with the evils resulting from contracts, com-
binations -and conspiracies in restraint of trade, and to that end to
exercise all the power it possessed.'90
While "all the power it possessed" has meant different things during
different periods, the statement clearly undermines the theory that
Congress meant for the jurisdiction of the Sherman Act to be narrower
than that under the Constitution-i.e., that it meant to exercise less
than "all the power it possessed." If Congress did use the full extent
of its power in enacting the Sherman Act, the logical interpretation
of Federal Baseball is that the Court was holding that baseball in 1922
did not meet the constitutional requirements for the exercise of fed-
eral power under the commerce clause. This interpretation is plausible
because the word "commerce" has not always been given the broad
sweep afforded it today.' 9' Federal Baseball was itself a product of
the narrower interpretation of "commerce" that was not entirely aban-
doned until the 1930's.192 Thus, while in 1922 baseball may not have
a case ... does not engage in commerce because the lawyer ... goes to another state."
Id. While this language may be cited to support the contention that the Court does not
consider the practice of law "commerce" within the Sherman Act, it is clearly dictum
and its effect on any decision by the Court today would likely be minimal.
189. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 13 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 95
S. Ct. 223 (1974); Coleman, supra note 184.
190. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932) (em-
phasis added).
191. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 12 (1894), which held that
"interstate commerce" did not include either the manufacturing or production process,
but only the actual sale of goods.
192. See Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 233
(1947) (suggesting that the old standards of "trade or commerce" persisted in certain
applications as late as the 1930's).
The Sherman Act was not applied to personal services until the 1930's and later.
See United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
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been considered within the regulatory power of Congress, Federal Base-
ball cannot support an inference that Congress intended to limit the
reach of the Sherman Act to an earlier and more restrictive interpreta-
tion of the commerce clause.193
This conclusion is supported by the Court's decision in Atlantic
Cleaners & Dyers v. United States,'94 which arose under section three
of the Sherman Act, 95 a provision dealing with the District of Colum-
bia. The Court assumed, without deciding, that while Congress exer-
cised all its power in passing section one of the Act, 96 that power was
necessarily circumscribed by the commerce clause and therefore would
not (when the Atlantic Cleaners case was decided in 1932) reach
the defendant's cleaning and dyeing activities. 97 Congress' constitu-
tional power to regulate activities in the District of Columbia was, how-
ever, plenary and thus any barrier to reaching the defendants' Wash-
ington operations would have to be implied from the language of sec-
tion three of the statute, which contains the same "trade or commerce"
phrasing as does section one. The defendants argued that the restric-
tive interpretation of "trade or commerce" enunciated in section one
cases like Federal Baseball should logically be applied to the identical
language in section three. The Court disagreed on the ground that
the earlier limitations on section one jurisdiction were mandated only
by the contours of the commerce clause and not the language or intent
of Congress and thus should not be applied. 93
This interpretation of Federal Baseball is further supported by a
review of the Court's subsequent treatment of the case. The Federal
Baseball exemption has not been extended to other activities. This
refusal to extend Federal Baseball is consistent with the thesis that
the case concluded only that baseball was not within the scope of the
commerce power in 1922: the Court could subsequently find that the
definition of "commerce" had broadened and activities similar to
baseball were, thus, within the scope of federal power.
In Toolson v. New York Yankees,'99 the Court reaffirmed Federal
193. See Note, The Applicability of the Sherman Act to Legal Practice and Other
"Non.commercial" Activities, 82 YALE LJ. 313, 322-23 (1972).
194. 286 U.S. 427 (1932).
195. 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).
196. 286 U.S. at 435.
197. Id. at 433.
198. In fact, the use of the phrase "trade or commerce among the several states"
probably stemmed from a congressional awareness of the constitutional limitations that
would have to be placed on a "restraint of trade" doctrine in a federal statute. See H.
THORELLr, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AmERIcAN TRADITION
222 n.151 (1955).
199. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
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Baseball, partially on the ground that Congress tacitly approved the
case because it failed to legislatively modify the holding in the thirty
years following it. In its per curiam opinion, the Toolson Court indi-
cated that "[w]ithout reexamination of the underlying issues" it
would adhere to the conclusion "that Congress had no intention of in-
cluding the business of baseball within the scope of the federal anti-
trust laws." 200 However, the dissent understood the Court to be re-
affirming Federal Baseball on the basis that baseball was still not com-
merce in 1953: "Whatever may have been the situation when the Fed-
eral Baseball Club case was decided in 1922, I am not able to join to-
day's decision which in effect, announces that organized baseball, in
1953, still is not engaged in interstate trade or commerce. '20 1
In light of the Court's strikingly dissimilar treatment of cases in-
volving activities factually almost identical to professional baseball, it
is now clear that Toolson rests almost solely on the principle of stare de-
cisis. In one case2 02 the Court refused to apply Federal Baseball to
the business of producing, booking, and presenting legitimate theatrical
attractions on a multistate basis, despite the fact that the actual presen-
tation of a theatre attraction takes place locally in the same manner as
a baseball game. The existence of certain interstate commercial transac-
tions, insufficient in Federal Baseball to warrant application of the an-
titrust laws, was sufficient for a finding that "interstate commerce!' in-
cluded the business of producing theatrical attractions. In a compan-
ion case,2 °8 the Court found that Federal Baseball did not apply to the
multistate promotion of professional boxing contests. Acknowledging
that a boxing match was essentially a local matter, the Court held that
the local nature of the activity was immaterial to the commerce deter-
mination where there existed some related interstate commercial trans-
actions.2 04
Finally, in refusing to apply the Federal Baseball ruling to profes-
sional football,0 5 the Court acknowledged its strong reservations about
the baseball exemption: "If [the refusal to apply the baseball exemp-
tion to football] is unrealistic, inconsistent, or illogical, it is sufficient to
answer. . . that were we considering the question of baseball for the
first time upon a clean slate we would have no doubts. '20 6  Pointing
200. Id. at 357.
201. Id. (Burton, J., dissenting).
202. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222 (1954).
203. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
204. Id. at 241.
205. Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
206. Id. at 452.
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to the practical problems in overruling Federal Baseball, the Radovich
Court said that it would give the case only the narrowest possible ap-
plication.20 7  In Flood v. Kuhn,205 the Court frankly acknowledged
that the sports cases conflict:
Accordingly, we adhere once again to Federal Baseball and Toolson
and to their application to professional baseball. We adhere also to Inter-
national Boxing and Radovich and to their respective applications to
professional boxing and professional football. If there is any incon-
sistency or illogic in all this, it is an inconsistency and illogic of long
standing that is to be remedied by Congress and not by this Court.209
An examination of the cases following Federal Baseball thus dem-
onstrates that any reliance on the decision as supporting the existence
of an antitrust exemption for the "learned professions" is misplaced.
To attempt to justify the existence of a "learned profession" exemp-
tion on the basis of a case considered today to be an aberration, as the
Goldfarb court did,210 is plausible but fallacious.
C. The Practice of Law as "Commerce"
If Federal Baseball is properly interpreted and it is accepted that
Congress "exercised all the power it possessed" in passing the Sher-
man Act, 211 then the "learned profession" exemption can exist today
only if Congress still does not have the power to regulate the interstate
aspects of the practice of law because it does not constitute "commerce"
in the constitutional sense and the activities of bar associations do not
have a restraining effect on some other sector of the economy that is
sufficiently "commercial." The Supreme Court has never directly an-
swered the question of whether the practice of the "learned professions"
is "commerce ' 2 2 and the circuit courts have split on the issue. 1a
207. Id. at 451. In Haywood v. National Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971),
the Court refused to exempt professional basketball from the antitrust laws.
208. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
209. Id. at 284.
210. 497 F.2d at 13.
211. Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).
212. In these instances where members of a "learned profession" have been found
to have violated federal antitrust laws, the Court has based its decision on the fact that
they had restrained some other "commercial" business. See American Medical Ass'n v.
United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943).
213. In Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266, 268 (8th Cir.
1957), the Eighth Circuit refused to apply the Sherman Act to a local medical society,
basing its decision partially on the ground that the practice of medicine was not "trade
or commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. On the other hand,'in United
States v. American Medical Ass'n, 110 F.2d 703, 712 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 310 U.S.
644 (1940), the District of Columbia Circuit refused to sustain the defendant's demurrer
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However, the Supreme Court has made several decisions relevant to a
consideration of the problem.
The first case to suggest that the practice of a profession might
not be "commerce" within the meaning of the antitrust laws was FTC
v. Raladam Co.,214 decided by the Court in 1931. The action in that
case was brought under the Federal Trade Commission Act.21 5 The re-
spondent had been ordered by the FTC to cease representing his "obes-
ity cure" as a scientific method of treating obesity. The Supreme Court
refused to uphold the order, finding that there was no showing of in-
jury to competition in the record,21 6 and thus, that the Commission
was without jurisdiction.1 7 Nevertheless, the Court went on to discuss
in dictum the possibility that the medical profession might have been
an injured competitor: "Of course, medical practitioners, by some
of whom the dangers of using the remedy without competent advice
was exposed, are not in competition with respondent. They follow a
profession and not a trade, and are not engaged in the business of
making or vending remedies, but in prescribing them."2118 It is this
language that is often cited in support of the contention that lawyers
are not engaged in "trade or commerce." 21 19 However, while the
quoted language is strong, it does not state the holding of the case.
Further, the issue under discussion was whether doctors would have
been proper plaintiffs,220 while in the bar association cases the question
is whether lawyers are proper defendants.
To determine the weight to be given the language in Raladam, it
based, in part, on the contention that the practice of medicine did not constitute a
"trade" within the meaning of section three of the Sherman Act.
214. 283 U.S. 643, 653 (1931). The Fourth Circuit in Goldfarb placed heavy reli-
ance on the language of Raladam in finding a "learned profession" exemption. 497 F.2d
at 13.
215. See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). The fact that the case arose under the Federal
Trade Commission Act rather than the Sherman Act is not significant since the Federal
Trade Commission Act is to be construed in par materia with the Sherman Act. Amer-
ican Cyanimid Co. v. FTC, 363 F.2d 757, 770 (6th Cir. 1966); see Atlantic Ref. Co.
v. FTC, 344 F.2d 599, 605 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 939 (1965).
216. It appears that the FTC assumed that there was an injury to the medical profes-
sion but made no attempt to show it. See Raladam Co. v. FTC, 42 F.2d 430 (6th Cir.
1930); Raladam Co., 12 F.T.C. 363 (1927).
217. The Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. (1970), requires,
for jurisdiction, a showing of actual injury to competition, while under the Sherman Act
it is sufficient that anyone is injured in his "business or property." 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1970).
218. 283 U.S. at 653 (emphasis added).
219. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 13 & n.33 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 95 S. Ct. 223 (1974).
220. Actually, private parties could not have been plaintiffs under the Federal Trade
Commission Act. See note 48 supra. Thus the issue, more precisely stated, was
whether the FTC could invoke its jurisdiction on behalf of injured doctors.
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is necessary to examine the courts' subsequent treatment of the profes-
sions. The first case following Raladam to mention the relationship
of the "learned professions" to the antitrust laws was Atlantic Clean-
ers & Dyers, Inc. v. United States,2 '1 in which the Court held that
cleaners and dyers were engaged in trade and that a combination
among them to maintain prices in the District of Columbia was a vio-
lation of section three of the Sherman Act. To support its decision,
the Court quoted a passage from an earlier opinion in The Nymph 222
by Justice Story which dealt with the broad scope of the word
"trade."
[T]he word 'trade' is often and, indeed, generally used in a broader
sense, as equivalent to occupation, employment, or business, whether
manual or mercantile. Wherever any occupation, employment, or
business is carried on for the purpose of profit, or gain, or a liveli-
hood, not in the liberal arts or in the learned professions, it is con-
stantly called a trade.223
The last line has been said to support the existence of a "learned pro-
fession" exemption. 224  Such a reading is inappropriate since the At-
lantic Cleaners Court was considering only the question of whether
"trade" was broad enough to include cleaners and dyers.2 25 The Nymph
quotation was used to support an extension of the definition of "trade
or commerce" to activities not previously considered within the scope
of the phrase, not to establish the limits of its application. The passing
reference to the learned professions would seem to be of little signifi-
cance.
In a second case during the 1930's, Semler v. Oregon State Board
of Dental Examiners,226 the Court did recognize that it was undesir-
able for professionals to engage in some competitive practices. The
case upheld an Oregon statute which prohibited a dentist from adver-
tising to solicit patients. The opinion focused on whether the statute
violated due process and equal protection rights under the fourteenth
amendment, and the Court, in upholding the regulation, noted the
state's interest in restraining professional advertising:
221. 286 U.S. 427 (1932).
222. 18 F. Cas. 506 (No. 10,388) (C.C.D. Me. 1834).
223. 286 U.S. at 436, quoting The Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506 (No. 10,388) (C.C.D.
Me. 1834). The Court later cited the same language in United States v. National Ass'n
of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1950).
224. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 13 & n.35 (4th Cir.), cert. granted,
95 S. Ct. 223 (1974).
225. "We think the word 'trade' was used in § 3 of the Sherman Act in the general
sense attributed to it by Justice Story and, at least, is broad enough to include the acts
of which the Government complains." 286 U.S. at 437.
226. 294 U.S. 608 (1935).
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The community is concerned with the maintenance of professional
standards which will insure not only competency in individual practi-
tioners, . . . but against practices which would tend to demoralize the
the profession by forcing its members into an unseemly rivalry which
would enlarge the opportunities of the least scrupulous. What is gen-
erally called the "ethics" of the profession is but the consensus of ex-
pert opinion as to the necessity of such standards.22 7
In a later decision, the Court reiterated that the ethical considerations
involved in the practice of a profession might require different treat-
ment of business and professional activitiesY.28
In 1943, the Court was directly faced with the question of
whether a "learned profession" exemption existed, but avoided an-
swering it.229  The Court upheld the conviction of the American
Medical Association for conspiring to violate the Sherman Act by ob-
structing the development of Group Health, a private prepaid medical
group. The AMA argued that the practice of medicine was not "trade
or commerce" within the meaning of the Act. The Court found it un-
necessary to confront this argument230 and went on to hold that the
AMA was subject to the Sherman Act in the instant case since "the
calling or occupation of the individual physicians charged as defend-
ants is immaterial if the purpose and effect of their conspiracy was such
obstruction and restraint of the business of Group Health. ' 231 The
decision made clear that when members of a learned profession con-
227. Id. at 612.
228. United States v. Oregon State Medical Soe'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1951). The Court
said, "We might observe in passing, however, that there are ethical considerations where
the historic direct relationship between patient and physician is involved which are quite
different than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary matters." Id. at 336. The
case involved the charge that doctors conspired to restrain and monopolize the business
of providing prepaid medical care in the state of Oregon. However, the case has limited
precedential value because the Court concluded that "no concerted refusal to deal with
private health associations has been proved, [so] we need not decide whether it would
violate the antitrust laws." Id.
229. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). The case arose
under section three of the Sherman Act, which applies to restraints of trade in the Dis-
trict of Columbia and the territories, rather than under section one. The distinction,
however, is not relevant to the present question since the issue in the case was the defini-
tion of "trade or commerce" and not whether an admittedly "commerical" activity was
"interstate."
230. The Court explained, "Much argument has been addressed to the question of
whether a phytician's practfce of his profession constitutes trade under § 3 of the Sher-
man Act. In light of what we shall say with respect to the charge laid in the indictment,
we need not consider or decide the question." Id. at 528.
231. Id. It was suggested in Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States
Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 654 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970), that the American Medical Association case required a show-
ing of both a "purpose" and "effect" to restrain commerce.
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spire to restrain "non-professionar' commerce, they are fully subject to
the provisions of the Sherman Act notwithstanding their occupation.
The unanswered question was whether a restraint on the practice of a
profession by its own members is within the reach of the Act.23
United States v. National Association of Real Estate Boards 3 is
the case most damaging to the contention that there is a professional
exemption from the Sherman Act, although the defendants in this case
probably would not fall within the ambit of the "learned professions."
The Court had previously suggested that the Sherman Act was in-
tended to reach the suppression of competition in the marketing of both
goods and services, rejecting the prevailing assumption that the Act
could be applied only to "trade or commerce" involving tangible
goods.234 This broadened concept of the purpose of the Sherman Act
became the basis of the Court's decision in United States v. National
Association of Real Estate Boards.23
The Court held that the Washington Real Estate Board violated
the Act by adopting a fee schedule for the various services performed
by a realtor. To the contention that the personal services offered by a
real estate broker did not come within the meaning of "trade or com-
merce," the Court replied:
The fact that the business involves the sale of personal services rather
than commodities does not take it out of the category of "trade" with-
in the meaning of § 3 of the Act. The Act was aimed at combina-
tions organized and directed to control of the market by suppression
of competition "in the marketing of goods and services. '236
The Court went on to cite again the language of Justice Story from
The Nymph describing the broad nature of "trade. 237 Justice Douglas
carefully noted that the Court did "not intimate an opinion on the cor-
232. While it was alleged in Goldfarb that bar association fee schedules restrained
the interstate housing market, the court applied the "learned profession" exemption only
to the alleged restraint of the practice of law. 497 F.2d at 15. It would appear that
if the housing restraint had not been excused on the ground that it was not "interstate,"
the bar association fee schedules would have been subject to the antitrust laws under
American Medical Association. See note 185 supra and accompanying text.
233. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
234. Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,'310 U.S. 469 (1940). Until personal services
were held to be within the scope of the Sherman Act, it was difficult to contend that
the practice of a doctor or lawyer was subject to the law's restrictions. Thus, early cases
must be examined with caution.
235. 339 U.S. 485 (1950).
236. Id. at 490.
237. Id., quoting The Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506 (No. 10,388) (C.C.D. Me. 1834).
See note 223 supra and accompanying text.
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rectness of the application of the term to the professions."2 8  Never-
theless, the effect of the decision was to undermine the argument that
an exemption existed. The holding that the sale of nonprofessional
personal services, absent the manufacture, purchase, or sale of goods
does constitute a "trade" would appear difficult to distinguish, for any
line drawn between "professional" and "nonprofessional" personal
services would clearly have to be arbitrary. The Supreme Court might
find it awkward to justify an exemption for doctors and lawyers, while
architects,2 39 realtors, 240 engineers, '41 pharmacists, 242 and accountants243
have allowed the Justice Department to obtain consent judgments
against them and thus given up their claims to exemption. 244  In addi-
tion, the Court specifically found that fee schedules used by the Wash-
ington Real Estate Board were a restraint of trade under the Sherman
Act.245
Further doubt is cast upon the viability of distinguishing between
professional and nonprofessional services by a decision which held that
price schedules published by an association of pharmacists selling pre-
238. 339 U.S. at 492.
239. See, e.g., United States v. American Institute of Architects, 1972 Trade Cas.
73,981 (D.D.C. 1972).
240. See, e.g., United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485
(1950); United States v. Cleveland Real Estate Bd., 1972 Trade Cas. 74,020 (N.D.
Ohio 1972); United States v. Long Island Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas.
74,068 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
241. See, e.g., United States v. American Soe'y of Civil Eng'rs, 1972 Trade Cas.
73,950 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
In United States v. National Soe'y of Professional Eng'rs, 43 U.S.L.W. 2269
(D.D.C. Dec. 12, 1974), the district court refused to exonerate engineers from Sherman
Act liability on the basis of the "learned profession" exemption.
The concept of a learned profession exception to the antitrust laws is of dubi-
ous validity in view of the repeated reluctance of federal courts to recognize it
as a legitimate exception to the Sherman Act. It would be a very dangerous
form of elitism, indeed, to dole out exemptions to our antitrust laws merely
on the basis of the educational level needed to practice a given profession ....
Id.
The court went on to note that engineers would not qualify for an exemption anyway,
because of the business nature of professional engineering. Id.
242. See, e.g., Northern Cal. Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 306 F.2d 379
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical
Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah), appeal dismissed, 306 F.2d 493 (10th Cir.), affd
mem., 371 U.S. 24 (1962).
243. See, e.g., United States v. American Institute of Certified Pub. Accountants,
Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. 74,007 (D.D.C. 1972).
244. A consent decree has the same force and effect as a litigative judgment, except
that it may not be used as prima facie evidence of a violation in a subsequent civil pro-
ceeding. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(a), (1970). If the Supreme Court had created an antitrust
exemption broad enough to encompass the groups enumerated in the text, they could pe-
tition for a modification of the decrees under FFD. R. CIrv. P. 60(b)(5). However, bar-
ring such action, the groups would be subject to the provisions of the decrees.
245. 339 U.S. at 488.
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scription drugs violated section one of the Sherman Act. 246 The District
Court for the District of Utah flatly stated that "the mere circum-
stance that goods in commerce are treated or handled by, or otherwise
connected with, a learned profession does not remove the goods them-
selves, nor transactions affecting them, from the applicability of the
Sherman Act. '247  The Supreme Court affirmed per curiam, upholding
the outcome, if not the rationale, of the lower court decision. 248
Thus, for the first time a professional association was found to be re-
straining trade when engaged in activities related to its own profes-
sion. While it might be argued that the pharmacists were restraining
the sale of drugs rather than the practice of their own profession, such
an argument cannot stand when examined closely. The drugs which a
pharmacist dispenses are the product of the practice of his profession,
as much as a will or a deed is the product of the practice of the legal
profession.240 In most states only a licensed pharmacist can sell drugs;
thus, the practice of pharmacy and the legal sale of drugs are one and
the same. To hold that the sale of drugs is something separate from
the profession of pharmacy would be to say that the practice of a pro-
fession is different from the profession itself.
The Supreme Court has not analyzed the policy reasons that might
justify the creation of an exemption for members of the "learned pro-
fessions." The lower courts have developed this concept from rather
offhand dicta. It is now clear that activities of professionals that have
a restraining effect on other businesses are not protected by any ex-
emption.20  The Supreme Court has yet to rule directly on the ques-
tion of whether it will recognize an antitrust exemption for profession-
als when the effect of their activity restrains only the practice of their
own profession. Although policy arguments can be advanced in favor
of an exemption, these arguments might more appropriately be ad-
dressed to a legislative body; and in any event they are unconvincing
where price-fixing is the alleged offense.
[P]olicy arguments, of course, deserve serious consideration. There
are indeed many factors which might convince a lawmaking body that
the legal profession should not be subjected to all of the rigor of the
Sherman Act. However, the creation of exemptions to the Sherman
Act is the province of Congress, not the courts....
246. United States v. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n, 201 F. Supp. 29 (D. Utah), appeal
dismissed, 306 F.2d 493 (10th Cir.), aff'd mem., 371 U.S. 24 (1962).
247. 201 F. Supp. at 33.
248. Utah Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. United States, 371 U.S. 24 (1962).
249. "[A] pharmacist in filling a prescription is engaged in the practice of a learned
profession. . . ." 201 F. Supp. at 33.
250. See American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943).
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Furthermore, the argument for exempting price-fixing activities of
a "learned profession" is significantly weaker than -the argument for
exemption of other professional activities. Price-fixing is a per se viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. . . .Most restraints of competition are
subject to the "Rule of Reason," which calls for balancing the
various harms and benefits occasioned to the public by the conduct in
question. Thus, even though fee schedules are not immune from Sher-
man Act scrutiny, the professional bans on solicitation and advertis-
ing may still survive-if the public benefit from these ethical can-
ons outweighs the competitive harm.251
Thus reasoned the District Court for Oregon in rejecting the Goldfarb
court's view and refusing to exonerate the Oregon State Bar on the ba-
sis of a supposed "learned profession" exemption.
D. The "Noncommercial Purpose" Exemption
The decision in the Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Mid-
dle States Association of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc.2 ,
raises the possibility that application of the antitrust laws to bar associ-
ation fee schedules may be limited to the extent that the schedules have
a "noncommercial purpose." Marjorie Webster involved a suit by a
profit-making junior college against a regional college accreditation as-
sociation made up of competing non-profit educational institutions.
The college sought to enjoin enforcement of a rule denying accredita-
tion to schools operated for profit without an inquiry into the quality
of the education that they offered.253 One of the plaintiff's conten-
tions was that the association's accreditation procedures violated the
Sherman Act. The court found that the regional accrediting associ-
ation had an essentially "noncommercial purpose" and therefore held
that the antitrust laws were inapplicable to its activities. 2 4  Relying on
251. United States v. Oregon State Bar, 43 U.S.L.W. 2234 (D. Ore. Nov. 25, 1974).
252. 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965 (1970). The Marjorie
Webster "noncommercial purpose" doctrine should be distinguished from that developed
earlier by several writers to protect expressive activities such as consumer boycotts. See
Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Noncommercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970
Duim L.J. 247; Coons, Non-Commercial Purpose as a Sherman Act Defense, 56 Nw.
U.L. REv. 705 (1962).
253. 432 F.2d at 653.
254. Id. at 655. An exemeption based on the theory that the restrained activity did
not constitute "trade or commerce" within the meaning of the Sherman Act (i.e., the
"learned profession" exemption) was unavailable since the junior college, the alleged
object of the restraint, operated for profit and thus was clearly engaged in "trade or com-
merce."
The court's resort to an inquiry into the purpose of the restraint is reminiscent of
the "dominant purpose to affect interstate commerce" test adopted by some courts to
avoid an otherwise inescapable finding that a restraint has an interstate effect. See
notes 133-48 supra and accompanying text.
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a presumed congressional intention that not all activities were to fall
within the scope of the Sherman Act, the court asserted:
[Tihe proscriptions of the Sherman Act were "tailored . . . for the
the business world," not for the non-commercial aspects of the lib-
eral arts and learned professions. In these contexts, an incidental re-
straint of trade, absent an intent or purpose to affect the commer-
cial aspects of the profession, is not sufficient to warrant applications
of the antitrust laws.255
In reaching its conclusion, the court seemed to rely on language
in Eastern Railroad Presidents' Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight
that the Sherman Act was "tailored for the business world. 250  An
examination of that case shows the phrase to be taken totally out of
context. The full sentence reads, "The proscriptions of the Act, tai-
lored as they are for the business world, are not appropriate for appli-
cation in the political arena. 257  Eastern Railroad dealt with the right
of individuals to lobby for legislation, even though motivated by their
commercial interests. The antitrust exemption for political activities
is prompted by the constitutional problems that would arise if the Sher-
man Act were allowed to interfere with the constitutional right of free
speech and the ability of individuals to communicate with their elected
representatives. Cases articulating this exemption cannot be relied
upon to support the contention that a "noncommercial purpose" ex-
emption exists where no political activities are involved. To buttress
its concept of the limitations of the Sherman Act, the Marjorie Webster
court also cited258 language from Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc.2 0 which described the antitrust exemption granted labor unions.
On this point, the Kor's opinion stated: "The Court in Apex recog-
nized that the Act is aimed primarily at combinations having commer-
cial objectives and is applied only to a very limited extent to organiza-
tions, like labor unions, which normally have other objectives. 260
However, an examination of Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader61 reveals
that the Sherman Act's limited application to labor unions is based upon
explicit congressional enactments regarding unions,26 not upon a "per-
ceived intent" of the Sherman Act.263 There has been no legislation re-
255. Id. at 654 (footnotes omitted).
256. 365 U.S. 127, 141 (1961).
257. Id.
258. 432 F.2d at 654.
259. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
260. Id. at 213 n.7.
261. 310 U.S. 469 (1940).
262. See Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970).
263. 310 U.S. at 488. In fact, the Court pointed out that eleven bills were introduced
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stricting the applicability of the Sherman Act to educational accredit-
ing associations or the practice of law.
Marjorie Webster appears to be based principally on an errone-
ous inference drawn from the Supreme Court's statement in the
American Medical Association case that "the calling or occupation of
the. . . defendants is immaterial if the purpose and effect of their con-
spiracy" was to restrain commerce. 264  The District of Columbia Cir-
cuit treated the case as establishing two separate elements necessary for
the application of the antitrust laws: an anticompetitive "purpose" and
an anticompetitive "effect." While the "effect" of the conspiracy in
Majorie Webster was anticompetitive, the court viewed its "purpose"
as permissible. Of course, many anticompetitive schemes have some
laudable purpose, and it was the difficulty of ferreting out the real
or dominant purpose of a defendant's actions that led the Supreme
Court in United States v. Griffith265 to hold that a defendant's pur-
pose could be inferred from the natural consequences of his acts:
It is . . . not always necessary to find a specific intent to restrain
trade or build a monopoly in order to find that the anti-trust laws have
been violated. It is sufficient that a restraint of trade or monopoly re-
sults as a consequence of the defendant's conduct or business arrange-
ments.266
Griffith suggests that only one element need be shown to establish anti-
trust liability-an anticompetitive "purpose and effect" to be deter-
mined by examining the effect of the challenged activity. Thus, there
would seem to be little foundation for Marjorie Webster's holding that
a defendant may escape liability by demonstrating a sufficiently "non-
commercial" (and therefore not anticompetitive) purpose.2 67
In support of the Marjorie Webster decision is the notion that a
certain amount of professional self-regulation is accelitable and neces-
in Congress shortly after the passage of the Sherman Act, providing for exemption of
labor from the Act; all failed to pass.
264. American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519, 528 (1943) (emphasis
added).
265. 334 U.S. 100, 105 (1948).
266. Id.
267. It has been argued that failure to adopt something like a "noncommercial pur-
pose" exemption might lead to antitrust liability for activities such as consumer boycotts
of stores or products by civil rights groups. See 84 HA.v. L. Rnv. 1912, 1916 (1971).
There are several distinctions between the consumer boycott situation and that in Mar-
jorie Webster which would justify exemptions for consumer actions. The boycott is gen-
erally ad hoc in nature, initiated by diverse individuals, and not the result of continuing
associations. The consumers do not themselves engage in the sort of business being re-
strained (as did members of the accrediting association in Marjorie Webster). Finally,
the consumer boycott action in many cases represents an expression of opinion which
would be protected under the first amendment. See authorities cited in note 252 supra.
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sary. It can be argued that American Medical Association did estab-
lish a separate "purpose and effect" test when dealing with the pro-
fessions, and that GriHith would therefore be inapplicable. This argu-
ment is supported not by the case law but by what are believed to be
paramount public policies. Government regulation of the profession
may be deemed undesirable as too great an imposition on individual
autonomy, yet it may still be important to insure the public some
measure of protection against unscrupulous practices. In this scenario,
the only alternative is self-regulation; there is thus a compelling need
to permit it despite the language and interpretive history of the anti-
trust laws. Of course, if the need to allow self-regulation is so com-
pelling, surely Congress would recognize it and respond with appropri-
ate legislation, as it has done for labor unions. However, in the ab-
sence of congressional action, it would seem inappropriate for a court
to commit such drastic surgery on a statute.
Even if the Marjorie Webster court was correct in discerning a
"noncommercial purpose" exemption from the antitrust laws, there are
several reasons why such an exemption should not be extended to cover
the promulgation of bar association fee schedules. First, bar associ-
ation fee schedules are a form of price-fixing.268  To support its posi-
tion that the Sherman Act was not intended to reach every restraint,
the Marjorie Webster court had relied on Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 269 but Standard Oil dealt with the "rule of reason," which the Su-
preme Court has rejected where price-fixing is concerned.2 7 0  Thus, the
supposed "noncommercial purpose" limitation would apply only to sit-
uations where the restraint alleged is not price-fixing but one to which
the "rule of reason" would apply. There is a hint in Marjorie Web-
ster itself that had the restraint in that case been a per se violation like
price-fixing, the outcome might have been different.Y Since bar asso-
ciation fee schedules fix prices, and since price-fixing is a per se viola-
tion of the Sherman Act, fee schedules cannot be exempted from the
anti-trust laws on the ground that they have a "noncommercial pur-
pose."
A second reason that bar association fee schedules will not fall
within any "noncommercial purpose" exemption is that, while many
"noncommercial purposes" are cited for the fee schedules, their main
268. See notes 58-75 supra and accompanying text.
269. 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911).
270. See notes 65-71 supra and accompanying text.
271. "Appellee does not suggest that appellant's accreditation activities constitute a




objective appears to be to provide a floor for lawyers' income above
that which a competitive market would provide. Although other
activities of bar associations might normally be considered to have a
"noncommercial purpose," and hence be free from antitrust regulation
under a "noncommercial purpose" exemption, 272 an examination of
fee schedules leads to the conclusion that they have a clear commercial
purpose.
Among the various justifications advanced for fee schedules are
that they serve an informational function, both for lawyers and the
public, that they avoid the ethical problem of solicitation that might
arise if "price-shopping" for legal services was permitted, and that they
protect the public from the lawyer who would take on a large number
of cases at a low fee and then handle them incompetently. 3  Several
factors work against the presumption that fee schedules are designed
solely to meet these problems. While fee schedules claim to be merely
suggested or advisory, their violation may lead to disciplinary action. 4
Further, fees are always expressed in terms of a minimum rate rather
than an average rate or range of rates. Such measures would not seem
necessary if the purpose of fee schedules was to provide a source of
information. Solicitation in the form of advertising is at present effec-
tively prohibited by independent sanctions.2 75 The problem of the law-
yer who takes on more cases than he can handle exists today; it is not
clear that the abolition of fee schedules would necessarily mean that
the number of such lawyers would increase. Since the "noncom-
mercial" reasons given for fee schedules are so unconvincing, the
only remaining purpose to attribute to the schedules is the obvious
one: providing a minimum income level for lawyers above that which
would prevail in a free market. Of course, this objective is blatantly
antithetical to the free-market philosophy underlying the Sherman Act,
and is clearly anything but "noncommercial."
IV. THE STATE ACTION EXEMPTION
Even if a would-be antitrust plaintiff was able to demonstrate that
the use of bar association minimum fee schedules restrains interstate
commerce, and that the "learned profession" and "noncommercial pur-
pose" exemptions are inapplicable, he would still have another barrier
272. Such activities might include regulation of admission to the bar and the accredi-
tation of law schools.
273. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON THE ECONOMICS OF LAw PRACTIcE, MINmuM
FEE SCHEDULES (1970); Arnold & Corley, supra note 3.
274. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
275. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrry DR 2-101 (1969).
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to overcome before he could establish a bar association's liability: the
"state action" exemption from the antitrust laws.2 76  This exemption
is applicable if a state calls for individuals to act in a way that would
otherwise violate the antitrust laws; it places an umbrella over their
activities which immunizes them from federal antitrust liability. The
precise contours of this doctrine are unclear. Yet it could be of ex-
ceedingly great importance to the outcome of a case involving mini-
mum fee schedules. If a bar association can convince a court that the
state has acted to open its immunizing umbrella to cover the associ-
ation's promulgation of fee schedules, then the association will have
escaped liability, even though it might lose on every other issue.
The usefulness of the state action exemption as a means of pro-
tecting fee schedules may be diminished because most state bars have
withdrawn or suspended their schedules.2 77  While many local associ-
ations retain schedules, they have, at present, little involvement with
the state, and thus are less likely than their state counterparts to be
able to claim the benefit of the state action exemption .1 7  Nevertheless,
a study of the exemption remains relevant to the problem because (1)
a few state bars do retain fee schedules;2 79 (2) the state action exemp-
tion is sufficiently nebulous that some local bars might be able to claim
it;25 0 and (3) it might not be difficult for a state to rehabilitate an
otherwise infirm fee schedule by legislation keyed to the requirements
of the exemption. If all fee schedules appear to be in danger of fall-
ing before the antitrust laws, there could be pressure on some legisla-
tures to do something about the situation, and while a state cannot
legislate a "learned profession"' exemption or redefine the meaning that
federal courts give to "interstate commerce," it can, through appro-
priate steps, insulate price-fixing from liability by invoking the state
action exemption.
This section begins with a discussion of the state action exemp-
tion as articulated by the Supreme Court, and the conflicting underly-
276. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
277. See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text.
278. See, e.g., Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 12 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 95 S. Ct. 223 (1974):
The Fairfax County Bar Association is a voluntary organization composed
of members of the State Bar practicing in Fairfax County, Virginia. The As-
sociation is a private organization and does not derive its authority or efficacy
from the State. While it is clear that the State Bar recognizes local bar asso-
ciations it does not regulate or supervise local bar activities.
Thus, the local bar association was held not to qualify for the state action exemption.
279. See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
280. If a court were ready to find a state bar exempt from the antitrust laws on the
ground that its activities were authorized and supervised by the state, and its constituent
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lug policies. It then turns to the case law to see how the courts have
accommodated these conflicting policies in delineating the scope of the
exemption. No simple litmus test emerges; rather, different courts
have considered different factors to be dispositive. Some of the fac-
tors most frequently used to support the exemption are the presence of
a legislative policy favoring noncompetitive organization of a given in-
dustry28' and the degree of state supervision of the industry.2 82 Most
state and local fee schedules are authorized and administered in such a
way as to leave considerable doubt about their ability to meet these
criteria for exemption. Other factors occasionally discussed, such as
the consistency of state regulation with federal policy 283 and the exist-
ence of a "public purpose" for the regulation, 8 4 either create bogus
issues or have been treated so loosely as to render them meaningless.
While the eligibility of existing fee schedules for the state action ex-
emption is uncertain-but probably doubtful-because of the courts'
eclectic approach to construing the exemption, it is fairly clear that an
ingeniously drafted minimum fee scheme could qualify.
A. Parker v. Brown
Despite the seeming finality of the language of section one of the
Sherman Act,288 and despite the usual preference for broad application
of the antitrust laws, the Supreme Court has on occasion seen fit to
limit the scope of the Act in various ways. Perhaps one of the most
significant of the limitations "legislated" by the Court came more than
half a century after the enactment of the Act in Parker v. Brown,2"'
local bar associations could then factually be characterized as mere administrative sub-
divisions of the state association, instead of "voluntary organizations," no a priori reason
is apparent for refusing to extend exemption to the local bars as well. Another basis
for granting exemption to local bar associations might be the presence of express legisla-
tion establishing or regulating them. Of course, the availability of the exemption for
local, as well as for state, bar associations will vary with the organization and interrela-
tionship of the various groups in each state.
281. See authorities cited in note 302 infra.
282. See note 317 infra and accompanying text.
283. See authorities cited in note 330 infra.
284. See note 335 infra and accompanying text.
285. "Every contract, combination . . .or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce among the several States or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ... 
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
286. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). As important as this doctrine now seems, it may appear
strange that it was so long in coming. The delay can be best attributed to the previous
lack of state economic regulation which is so characteristic of our present societal struc-
ture. Even when Parker was finally decided, the state action exemption was apparently
not recognized as an important addition to the law. Only two major legal publications
discussed the case and, between them, only one footnote was devoted to the state action
holding. See 41 MICH. L. Rav. 968, 969 n.6 (1943); 27 Mn-N. L. REv. 468 (1943).
Vol. 1974:11641 1213
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
which held that Congress did not intend for the Sherman Act to apply
to state activities.287 Parker arose when the California legislature
passed the California Agricultural Prorate Act,288 which provided for
the establishment of agricultural marketing programs designed to re-
strict competition among producers and maintain price stability. The
Prorate Act first authorized the creation of a commission, with mem-
bers appointed by the Governor, which, after public hearings and the
consideration of relevant economic data, would select a Program Com-
mittee to formulate a marketing program. After another public hear-
ing the commission would then modify or approve the program as it
saw fit. Finally, the plan was to be submitted to the producers them-
selves for approval. A marketing program adopted pursuant to this
process would be binding on all producers, and the state would impose
penalties for its violation.
A producer of raisins sued to enjoin enforcement of a raisin mar-
keting plan established under the statute on the grounds that it con-
flicted with the Sherman Act, the Agricultural Marketing Agreement
Act,28 9 and the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
The district court granted the injunction, 290 but the Supreme Court re-
versed. In disposing of the antitrust claim, the Court assumed that the
marketing program would violate the Sherman Act if it were organized
and made effective by strictly private means and that Congress could
prohibit even a state plan by virtue of its commerce power. The Court
then announced the basis of its holding, pointing out that the market-
ing program
derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of
the state and was not intended to operate or become effective with-
out that command. We find nothing in the language of the Sher-
man Act or in its history which suggests that its purpose was to re-
strain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed by its leg-
islature.291
287. Earlier cases had hinted that a state action exemption might exist, though none
squarely so held until Parker. See, e.g., Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1904);
Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908, 911 (C.C.D.S.C. 1895).
288. Act of June 5, 1933, ch. 754, [1933] Cal. Stat. 1969, as amended by chs. 471,
743, [1935] Cal. Stat. 1530, 2088; ch. 6, [1938] Cal. Stat. Extra Sess. 39; chs. 363, 548,
894, [1939] Cal. Stat. 1702, 1947, 2485; chs. 603, 1150, 1186, [1941] Cal. Stat. 2050,
2858, 2943 (now CAL. Aomuc. Coon §§ 59641 et seq. (West 1968)).
289. 7 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq. (1970).
290. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Cal. 1941), rev'd, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
The district court based its decision on the commerce clause issue, and did not even con-
sider the Sherman Act claim.
291. 317 U.S. at 350-51. The Court supported its interpretation of the statute by
reference to the words of the Act's sponsor, Senator Sherman of Ohio. Senator Sher-
man, who never expressly affirmed or denied that the Act was meant to apply to the
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The Court refused to attribute to Congress the intent to deny to the
States the ability to enact their own economic regulatory schemes in
pursuit of a valid state purpose.29 2
Chief Justice Stone was careful to limit the holding in two ways.
First, he stated flatly-if somewhat cryptically-that a state cannot
simply authorize violations of the Sherman Act. 29 3  Second, he ex-
pressly noted that the case did not present the "question of the state or
its municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or
combination by others for restraint of trade."2 94  Although there has
been considerable disagreement as to the precise meaning of these res-
ervations, 95 it is clear that they do limit the scope of the Parker doc-
states, nevertheless did stress the fact that the proposed law was designed to limit busi-
ness combinations. See 21 CONG. REc. 2562 (1890) (remarks of Senator Sherman). It
is logical to assume that Congress never considered the question of the applicability of
the Sherman Act to the states, given the narrow scope afforded the commerce clause
at the time of the Act's passage. "As long as the state regulated events within its own
borders other than transportation heading for an out-of-state destination, the federal gov-
ernment probably lacked authority to regulate these same events." Slater, Antitrust and
Government Action: A Formula for Narrowing Parker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 71,
83 (1974).
292. 317 U.S. at 351. Different policy considerations have yielded diametrically op-
posite interpretations of the same language in different provisions of the Sherman Act.
Principles of federalism led the Court in Parker to hold that states are not "persons"
within the meaning of sections one and two of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970), re-
ferring to defendants. Yet only a year earlier, the preference for broad construction of
the statute had prompted the Court to hold that states were "persons" under section four
of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), defining proper plaintiffs. Georgia v.
Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162 (1942).
Parker would appear to be on firmer ground than Evans under standard principles
of statutory construction. Section eight of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7 (1970), and
section one of the Clayton Act, id. § 12. Both define "person" to include corporations
and associations for the purposes of all the substantive sections, and thus application of
the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius would suggest that Congress did not in-
tend to consider states "persons" for any purpose. However, the prior decision in Evans
precluded this argument in Parker.
293. "True, a state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman Act
by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action is lawful. . . ." 317
U.S. at 351. Justice Stone cited Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 332,
344-47 (1904), in support of his statement. The defendant in Northern Securities had
unsuccessfully contended that it was immune from antitrust liability by virtue of its
state-granted charter.
294. 317 U.S. at 351-52.
295. An extensive discussion of "participant" immunity is presented in White, Pdrtic-
ipant Governmental Action Immunity from the Antitrust Laws: Fact or Fiction, 50
TExAs L. Rnv. 474 (1972). See also Comment, Whitten v. Paddock: The Sherman Act
and the "Government Action" Immunity Reconsidered, 71 CoLuM. L. Rnv. 140 (1971)
(Parker applies only to regulatory, as opposed to proprietary, activity); Note, Antitrust
Immunity-Reevaluation & Synthesis of Parker v. Brown-Intent, State Action, Causa-
tion, 19 WAYNE ST. L. REv. 1245 (1973) (any contract with the state should be valid
absent conspiracy).
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Although Parker delimited the rough outlines of an exemption
from the federal antitrust laws,1 7 it did not establish any definitive
standards. Consequently, there has been a great deal of confusion in
the interpretation and application of the doctrine.29 8  The only aspect
of ,this state action theory which does clearly emerge from the Parker
opinion is the presence of two conflicting policy considerations: (1)
the express congressional policy to foster free competition, embodied in
the Sherman Act, our "economic magna carta,"29 and the con-
comitant notion that exemptions free from the statute should be tightly
construed;300 and (2) the implied congressional policy, bottomed on
the concept of federalism, of allowing the states to regulate their own
economic affairs by establishing noncompetitive market structures to
which the Sherman Act would not apply.301 Although the courts do
296. A third limitation on state action is the commerce clause itself, which may pro-
hibit intolerably severe "burdens on interstate commerce" which nevertheless qualify for
Parker immunity. See Note, State Action Exemption from the Antitrust Laws, 50 Bos-
TON U.L. REV. 393, 397 (1970).
297. Apparently the exemption is available under not only the Sherman Act but also
all of the antitrust laws. In Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d
502, 509 (4th Cir. 1959), the exemption was held to be available under section five of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970), and in United States v. Pa-
cific Sw. Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224, 1226-27 (C.D. Cal. 1973), the exemption was
deemed available (but not granted) under section seven of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 18 (1970).
298. One of the greatest sources of confusion in the interpretation and application
of the Parker doctrine is the great variety of different types of state participation en-
countered. They range from instances where the state operates a business, the ultimate
in state action, see Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th
Cir. 1971), to the case where the state simply authorizes a private entity to engage in
whatever anticompetitive activities it desires, a practice clearly invalid under Parker, cf.
Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1971) (invalidat-
ing a Virgin Islands statute which in effect authorized price-fixing by private persons).
Thus, it is important in considering the exemption in relation to minimum fee schedules
to confine oneself to cases treating analogous factual situations, i.e., those involving state
regulation as opposed to state proprietorship.
299. Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286, 1302 (5th Cir. 1971).
300. Actually, the Parker opinion never expressly mentioned the policy for broad ap-
plication of the antitrust laws, but the Court has emphasized that preference on other
occasions. See, e.g., United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 348
(1963); California v. FPC, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962). See also White, supra note 295,
at 479; Note, Parker v. Brown-Gone to Hecht: A New Test for State Action Exemp-
tions, 24 HASTINGS L.i. 287, 288 (1973).
301. See Teply, Antitrust Immunity of State and Local Government Action, 48 TtL.
L. Rav. 272, 278 (1974) (state experimentation should be encouraged); Comment, supra
note 295; Note, Of Raisins and Mushrooms: Applying the Parker Antitrust Exemption,
58 U. VA. L. REv. 1511, 1514 (1972).
A reasonable synthesis of these two policies would be that when a state has chosen
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not always deal explicitly with these policies, they do often focus on
the presence or absence of one or more of several factors in deciding
whether to grant or withhold exemption, and it will be seen that these
inquiries are implicit attempts to see that the conflicting policies are
accommodated to the greatest possible degree. The gist of what fol-
lows, however, is an analysis of the various approaches explicitly enun-
ciated in court opinions, and an evaluation of these approaches on
minimum fee schedules at the state and local level.
B. Legislative Policy Against Competition
One factor which many courts and commentators have deemed
important to a decision to grant the Parker exemption is the presence
of a legislative policy against competition.30 2  This element is de-
scribed variously as a legislative intent to supplant competition, 0 3 a leg-
islative determination that competition is not "summum bonum,"' 30 or,
as the Parker Court itself phrased the requirement, that the program re-
ceives "its authority and its efficacy from the legislative command of
the state."305  Despite the variety of expression, the tests applied un-
der these rubrics appear to be about the same. To merit the ex-
emption, the legislature must have either expressed its view that a com-
petition is undesirable or, as is the more usual case, enacted a scheme
necessarily calling for anticompetitive activity. The facts of Parker it-
self provide an excellent example of the first situation. There the es-
tablishment of marketing programs was authorized by the legislature
to enact a system of economic organization which is a substitute for the free market
which the Sherman Act seeks to protect, those persons participating in the system so
enacted should be exempt from the Act.
302. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 6 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 95
S. Ct. 223 (1974); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d
25, 30-31 (1st Cir. 1970); Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 576-
77 (10th Cir. 1962); Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 509
(4th Cir. 1959); United States v. Pacific Sw. Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224, 1227-28 (C.D.
Cal. 1973); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 298 F. Supp. 1109, 1111-12 (W.D. Pa.
1969); Schenley Indus., Inc. v. New Jersey Wine & Spirit Wholesalers Ass'n, 272 F.
Supp. 872, 882 n.16 (D.N.J. 1967); Simmons & Fomaciari, State Regulation as an Anti-
trust Defense: An Analysis of the Parker v. Brown Doctrine, 43 U. Cnr. L. REV.
61, 68 (1974); Comment, Antitrust Immunity: State Action Protection Under Parker
v. Brown, 7 U.S.F.L. REV. 453, 467-72 (1973); Note, supra note 295, at 1252-56; Com-
ment, The Wisconsin Minimum Fee Schedule: A Problem of Antitrust, supra note 3, at
1248.
303. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 576-77 (10th Cir.
1962); United States v. Pacific Sw. Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224, 1228 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
304. George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25, 30
(1st Cir. 1970) (roughly translated to "the highest good").
305. 317 U.S. at 350.
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for the specific purpose of eliminating price competition. 8
The consideration of this factor seems to facilitate the implemen-
tation of both underlying policies. First, by requiring that the legis-
lature have authorized the questioned activity, a court will have no
doubt that the state has indeed acted; and the argument for national
deference to state programs, based on concepts of federalism, is prob-
ably strongest when the state acts through its legislature. Second, by
requiring an express or necessarily implied preference for anticompeti-
tive activity, the court has the greatest possible assurance that had the
state considered the matter, it would have wanted the antitrust laws
suspended.307  Thus, the legislative policy inquiry serves the sensible
function of seeing that the exemption is not granted for conduct which
the state never intended to be immunized. 08
Just how stringently this requirement can be applied is illustrated
by Travelers Insurance Co. v. Blue Cross.309 The Pennsylvania De-
partment of Insurance regulated almost every aspect of Blue Cross'
operations and approved its contracts with hospitals. Yet, on a narrow
view of the state action exemption, Blue Cross was held not to
be immune to a claim that some of these contracts violated the anti-
trust laws.8 10 The court observed that where the exemption is mer-
ited, "not only does the legislature create the entity involved or en-
dow it with governmental character, but it also directs and authorizes
that entity by means of the same statute to utilize anticompetitive means
to achieve a specific governmental purpose."31' Under this view, a
legislative authorization for pervasive regulation of an industry is in-
sufficient to trigger the exemption unless the regulating agency is left
with no option but to employ anti-competitive measures. 31 2
Apparently, the only case to use the legislative policy test and find
it satisfied was Goldfarb.13  However, the facts upon which Goldfarb
306. Id. at 346.
307. For a discussion of when it may be necessary to imply an intent to supplant
competition, see Comment, Antitrust Immunity: State Action Protection Under Parker
v. Brown, supra note 302, at 468; Note, supra note 295, at 1225.
308. See Comment, Antitrust Immunity: State Action Protection Under Parker v.
Brown, supra note 302, at 477.
309. 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
310. However, the defendant was able to escape the application of federal antitrust
laws by means of the McCarran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011
et seq. (1970). See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 481 F.2d 80 (3d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 1093 (1973).
311. 298 F. Supp. at 1111.
312. See Simmons & Fornaciari, supra note 302, at 73. Contra, Gas Light Co. v.
Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir. 1971).
313. 497 F.2d at 12.
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was tried were somewhat peculiar. The Goldfarbs made the rather
puzzling stipulation that the Virginia State Bar had been given authority
to disseminate minimum fee schedule reports, 14 and this stipulation
made it quite easy for the Fourth Circuit to conclude that the legisla-
tive intent requirement had been satisfied. The apparent basis for the
stipulation was a Virginia statute which authorized the Supreme Court
of Appeals, the state bar's supervisory agency, to make rules and regu-
lations defining the practice of law and to prescribe a code of ethics.3 15
It seems highly doubtful that, absent the stipulation, the statute (or its
counterparts in other states) could be held to call necessarily for anti-
competitive organization of the legal profession.
Indeed, the district court in Goldfarb questioned the propriety of
the stipulation.3 16 The Fourth Circuit would not extend the Parker
exemption to the Fairfax County Bar Association partly because its
"regulatory activities are not founded on a legislative command as are
the activities of the State Bar. '31 7
A legislature could provide a mandate for both state and local bar
associations by the simple expedient of passing a statute authorizing
lawyers to adopt minimum fee schedules.318 However, no court has
314. Id. at 9. One possible explanation for the stipulation is that the Goldfarbs,
wanting to bring a "test" case to determine the status of fee schedules in general, did
not want the decision to turn on the absence of legislative authorization, a defect which
could readily be remedied by a sympathetic legislature, necessitating relitigation of other
more dispositive issues.
315. 7 VA. CODE ANN. § 54-48 (Supp. 1974). Other states have similar statutes.
See, e.g., OREGON REv. STAT. §§ 9.010, 9.080 (1973) (rule-making power delegated to
board of governors of state bar); TEXAs Civ. STAT. §§ 320a-1 et seq. (Supp. 1974) (rule-
making power delegated to Supreme Court of Texas). The Texas law contains the fol-
lowing provision: "Nothing herein shall be construed as authorizing the Court to pre-
scribe fees to be charged for legal services rendered by any attorney." Id. § 320a-1 (4).
In light of this provision, it is curious that Texas is one of the few states retaining a
minimum fee schedule, albeit a "voluntary" one. See Antitrust Law Misapplication to
Minimum Fee Schedules, 36 TEXAs B.J. 201, 220 (1973).
316. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 355 F. Supp. 491, 496 n.4 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 497 F.2d 1 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 223 (1974).
In finding no legislative authorization for the Oregon State Bar's fee schedule, the
District Court for Oregon observed:
[I]n Goldfarb the parties also stipulated that the regulation program received
its authority and efficacy from legislative command. No such stipulation exists
in the instant case. And even so, reliance on the stipulation in Goldfarb
begged the question, for the issue was whether the promulgation of fee sched-
ules was authorized by the legislature, not whether the general regulation of
attorneys was so authorized. United States v. Oregon State Bar, 43 U.S.L.W.
2234 (D. Ore. Nov. 25, 1974) (emphasis added).
317. 497 F.2d at 12.
318. Such was apparently the situation in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 361 F.2d 870
(4th Cir. 1966), where the North Carolina legislature authorized a rating bureau com-
posed of representatives of the insurance companies being regulated to prescribe mini-
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yet gone so far as to permit a state to authorize anticompetitive prac-
tices in such a casual manner; no court has yet confronted the question
of whether the legislative policy element standing alone is enough to
support exemption.
C. State Supervision
Some courts have construed Parker's caveat-that a state cannot
simply authorize violations of the Sherman Act-to require a modi-
cum of state supervision of the activities sought to be exempted from
antitrust liability. 19 Thus, at the least some state agency must have
the power to monitor and modify the practices of the private entitites
involved. This requirement serves the important function of assuring
that the state has really opted for a noncompetitive, regulatory alter-
native to the free market, and is not just trying to avoid the Sherman
Act's safeguards while retaining a system of unsupervised competition.
One of the principal unresolved questions about the state super-
vision factor is whether the power to supervise need be actively
exercised by the state. Only the Fourth Circuit has held that the mere
power to regulate is sufficient to satisfy the requirement. In Washing-
ton Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Electric & Power Co.,3 2o a state statute
provided that utility rates and practices would go into effect unless
modified or disapproved by the state's corporation commission. Plain-
tiff Washington Gas Light leveled an antitrust attack against certain of
VEPCO's rates and practices which had gone into effect under this
statute, although they had not been investigated or approved by the
commission. The Fourth Circuit held that VEPCO met the state super-
vision requirement because "it is just as sensible to infer that silence
means consent, i.e., approval. ' 321 The obvious problem with this the-
ory is that without active state supervision, the industry involved will
be regulated by neither the state nor the antitrust laws; and for this
reason the Washington Gas Light case has been much criticized. 22
mum insurance rates. The court did not specifically address itself to the legislative in-
tent issue, and upheld the legislation on other grounds. A similar scheme was struck
down in Norman's on the Waterfront, Inc. v. Wheatley, 444 F.2d 1011 (3d Cir. 1971).
319. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 6 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 95
S. Ct. 223 (1974); Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co., 440 F.2d 1135, 1140 (5th Cir.
1971); Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248, 251
(4th Cir. 1971); Asheville Tobacco Bd. of Trade, Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 502, 509 (4th
Cir. 1959).
320. 438 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1971).
321. Id. at 252.
322. See United States v. Oregon State Bar, 43 U.S.L.W. 2234 (D. Ore. Nov. 25,
1974); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153,
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Another issue yet to be settled is whether the existence of active
state supervision alone is sufficient to warrant the grant of the exemp-
tion. The notion is that the legislature, although not necessarily hav-
ing called for anticompetitive conduct, may regulate an industry so
comprehensively that its organization no longer resembles a free mar-
ket; thus application of the Sherman Act would be inapposite.3 23
Further, the state, because of the pervasiveness of its regulation,
should be able to combat any abuses that might develop. Of course,
to fit this "substitute for competition" model, the state's regulation
would have to be economic in nature; regulation of legal ethics, for ex-
ample, however tight, would probably be insufficient.
Apparently, only the Fifth Circuit has adopted this approach.8 24
In Gas Light Co. v. Georgia Power Co.,25 the court found the Georgia
Public Service Commission's regulation of the defendant to be sufficient
to immunize the defendant's alleged anticompetitive practices from
Sherman Act liability. The commission had given lengthy considera-
tion to each of the challenged rates and practices and had effected ma-
jor modifications in some of them. It seems clear that no state now
engages in the kind of active economic supervision of its bar which
would be necessary to claim exemption under the Fifth Circuit's test,
at least in the absence of other factors supporting exemption. Further-
more, most lawyers would probably feel that really comprehensive
regulation would be an intolerable burden on their profession and too
high a price for the retention of fee schedules.
D. Legislative Policy Plus State Supervision
The Fourth Circuit, recognizing that the "legislative policy against
competition" or "state supervision" factors standing alone may provide
an inadequate guide to whether the exemption should be granted, has
incorporated both elements into its Parker test. 26 Apparently, the
relationship between the factors is multiplicative, and both must be
1203 n.129 (D. Hawaii 1972) (Washington Gas Light was an unwarranted hyperexten-
sion of Parker); Teply, supra note 301, at 292-93; Note, supra note 300, at 305-06; Note,
supra note 301, at 1536-42; 85 HARv. L. REV. 670 (1972).
323. Contra, Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 298 F. Supp. 1109 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
See notes 309-12 supra and accompanying text.
324. Most courts have held that state supervision alone is insufficient to warrant the
exemption. See, e.g., United States v. Pacific Sw. Airlines, 358 F. Supp. 1224, 1227,
1229 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Blue Cross, 298 F. Supp. 1109, 1112
(W.D. Pa. 1969).
325. 440 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1971).
326. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 6 (4th Cir.), cert. granted,




present in some degree. Superficially, this standard appears very
strict, and it might have been expected to have made for a contrary re-
sult in Goldfarb. However, the Fourth Circuit's "silent supervision"
doctrine, enunciated in Washington Gas Light,327 renders the super-
vision requirement virtually meaningless, and allowed the Goldfarb
court to find that the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals provided the
necessary regulatory oversight. 28 While the "legislative policy" re-
quirement would not even have been colorably satisfied in Goldfarb
absent the parties' unusual stipulation of state authorization, it would
not seem difficult for the legislature of Virginia or any other state to
pass a pro forma authorizing statute which would also delegate super-
visory power over the bar to some agency; by doing nothing the
agency would satisfy Washington Gas Light, and the Fourth Circuit
would then presumably grant the exemption. There is no reason why
such a scheme would not be equally workable for local bar associa..
tions. On the other hand, a court like the Fifth Circuit which takes a
more serious view of the Supreme Court's caveat in Parker and re-
quires active supervision 32 9 would probably never find the "policy plus
supervision" standard met in any imaginable situation involving law-
yers.
E. Other Factors
Some courts and commentators, including some of those for
whom the "legislative policy" factor standing alone is insufficient, have
occasionally emphasized the importance of other factors in passing
on the applicability of the Parker exemption. One factor which is some-
times mentioned is the consistency of the state's program with federal
statutes other than the antitrust laws. 3 ° In Parker itself the Court
pointed out that the California law under attack was harmonious with
the federal Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act.331 While at pres-
ent there appears to be no federal statute either consistent or inconsist-
ent with the practice of promulgating minimum fee schedules, the
emergence of legislation embodying an aggressive federal policy of
increasing the availability of legal services to the middle-income citizen
327. See notes 320-22 supra and accompanying text.
328. 497 F.2d at 11.
329. See notes 324-25 supra and accompanying text.
330. See Donnem, Federal Antitrust Law Versus Anticompetitive State Regulation,
39 ABA ANTrRuST L.J. 950 (1970); Simmons & Fornaciari, supra note 302. at 67;
Teply, supra note 301, at 285-88; Note, supra note 296, at 400-02; rf. Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 386-89 (1951); Hecht v. Pro-Football,
Inc., 444 F.2d 931, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
331. 317 U.S. at 352-59.
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could well militate against the granting of the exemption by a court
which deemed the "federal policy" factor important. 332
Others have suggested that the activity sought to be exempted must
be a "suitable" one for state regulation.333 Since state power over eco-
nomic matters is acknowledged to be plenary, this requirement can only
mean that the state regulation is not preempted by some other law,
state or federal. Internal inconsistency of state law is not a proper issue
for a federal court. The state regulation may be "preempted" by the
federal antitrust laws, but that is the issue to be resolved. Thus, those
endorsing the "suitability" requirement must be referring to the pos-
sible inconsistency of -the state regulation with the existence of Con-
gress' general power to regulate interstate commerce. But an analysis
based on the federal commerce clause can be undertaken only after it
has been determined that Congress has not exercised its commerce
power in some way relevant to the problem-i.e., it must first be de-
termined that the antitrust laws do not apply. This too is the issue to
be resolved. Thus, the "suitability" analysis seems to be circular.
However, a minimum fee schedule, though exempt from the antitrust
laws under Parker, might be struck down because it places a "burden
on interstate commerce." 33 4
332. The resort to an inspection of other federal statutes as a means of resolving the
Parker question appears indefensible on theoretical grounds. If a state scheme is incon-
sistent with a federal statute then it should be struck down directly under the supremacy
clause. On the other hand, if state and federal programs are consistent, and the state
program is being subjected to antitrust attack, the logical inference is that there is some
contradiction between the federal program and the antitrust laws. The problem could
then be resolved by determining Congress' intent in passing the non-antitrust federal
measure. If a court determined that Congress intended to suspend the antitrust laws
pro tanto for the new federal program, it might reasonably extend this effect to similar
state programs, without having to ponder the vague Parker doctrine. In both cases, if
consideration of other federal laws proves helpful, the court should not be proceeding
under Parker.
333. See Teply, supra note 301, at 288; Note, supra note 296, at 397; Comment, The
Wisconsin Minimum Fee Schedule, supra note 302, at 1249.
334. Even if the Parker exemption operates to insulate a state-approved minimum fee
schedule from antitrust liability, it is still possible that the schedule might be struck
down as a burden on interstate commerce. Long ago the Supreme Court established the
principle that the federal commerce power in its dormant state might invalidate some
state restraints on interstate commerce. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 209
(1824). Before undertaking an analysis based on the dormant commerce clause, it must
first be determined that Congress has not exercised its commerce power in some way
relevant to the problem being considered. But when the Parker exemption is invoked,
and the antitrust laws are inapplicable, the Court has indicated that the situation is the
same as if Congress had never acted: "The question is thus presented whether in the
absence of Congressional legislation prohibiting or regulating the transactions affected
by the state program, the restrictions ...violate the Commerce Clause." Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 359 (1943). Therefore, a minimum fee schedule, exempt from
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Finally, the Goldfarb court added another factor-benefit to the
public. Because "the declared purpose of the [California] Act was to
conserve the agricultural wealth of the State and prevent its economic
waste,1'335 the Fourth Circuit concluded that Parker requires that the
legislation creating the restraint of trade be for the benefit of the
public.330  The effect of applying the "public benefit" requirement will
vary greatly, depending upon whether a court requires an "actual"
benefit, or only an "intention to benefit." The Goldfarb court, which
thought it clear "that courts should take cognizance of the benefits ac-
the antitrust laws under Parker, could still be invalidated if it constituted a sufficient
burden on interstate commerce.
Of course, the first step in a commerce clause analysis must be to determine
whether some interstate commerce is affected by the challenged activity; if commerce
is not even affected, it cannot be "burdened." Thus, if an activity does not have enough
effect on commerce to invoke Sherman Act jurisdiction, it will probably be true that it
cannot be a burden on interstate commerce. Beyond this point, however, the antitrust
and constitutional approaches diverge. Under the commerce clause approach, a court
must determine for itself the nature and magnitude of the state's interest in fostering
the activity that it has caused to be exempt from the antitrust laws. This interest must
then be weighed against the nature and magnitude of the deleterious effect produced on
interstate commerce. Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 781 (1945). Al-
though some lower courts seem to have balked at making the kind of in-depth inquiry
mandated by the Southern Pacific case, the Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that
even an "incidental consequence" for interstate commerce will warrant striking down a
state regulatory scheme where the state's interest is "tenuous." Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145-46 (1970).
Under the approach endorsed by the Supreme Court in Southern Pacific and Pike,
a court faced with an attack on a minimum fee schedule would first have to determine
the actual purpose underlying the fee schedule. See 397 U.S. at 144. A conscientious
court might well find the true purpose of the schedules to be the none-too-worthy one
of inflating lawyers' incomes. Even if a more proper purpose is assumed, it would still
be necessary to judge the effectiveness of minimum fees in achieving that purpose. See
325 U.S. at 779. It seems doubtful that fee lists are an effective means of informing
the public about legal services. Nevertheless, it can be speculated that most courts
would find that even the slight legitimate state interest in fee schedules would outweigh
the even slighter effect of the schedules on interstate commerce. While the schedules'
effect on commerce might be enough to invoke jurisdiction under an express congres-
sional measure, the Sherman Act, it is dubious that this effect is sufficient to invalidate
the schedules under a Court-created doctrine based only on the commerce clause.
The commerce clause analysis is available only when state action is claimed to bur-
den commerce; strictly private fee-fixing agreements would not be subject to attack under
this theory. But strictly private fee-fixing agreements should not be eligible for the
Parker exemption either. Conversely, once a fee schedule was found to have sufficient
state involvement to merit the Parker exemption, any burden it placed on interstate com-
merce would be considered a state-imposed burden. See 317 U.S. at 359.
335. 497 F.2d at 6.
336. Although the Fourth Circuit implied this requirement from the factual situation
of Parker, it finds no support in the express language of the opinion. Furthermore, the




cruing to the public" 3 7 nevertheless opted for the latter approach.
Since the state's entire ethics-regulating scheme was intended to protect
and benefit the public, it would be "manifestly unfair to dissect a state's
regulatory program into its various component parts, parts that were
meant to interrelate, ' 338 and to consider the public benefit derived from
the minimum fee schedules alone. Given that practically all legislation
is presumably enacted with the intention of benefiting the public, the
Fourth Circuit's formulation of this requirement seems vacuous. How-
ever, if a demonstration of real benefit was required as to each chal-
lenged practice, the door would be opened for-the courts to engage in
a sort of substantive due process-style analysis under the guise of con-
struing the Sherman Act. The ability of fee schedules to pass a true
"public benefit" as opposed -to "lawyer benefit" test seems dubious.
"The fee schedule should be examined apart from the general regula-
tory scheme; such an examination would disclose little public bene-
fit. 8 9
The multiplicity of factors considered by the courts in passing on
a Parker state action exemption claim, the disagreements among the
courts about the proper criteria for each factor and the weight, if any,
to be assigned it, and the unending variations in possible state schemes
for authorizing and administering minimum fee schemes all contribute
to the uncertainty shrouding the status of "state"-approved fee-fixing
under the antitrust laws. The commentators have set forth still other
factors which they say should be considered, such as the existence of
a causal link between the state action taken and the anticompetitive
effect created 340 and the existence of an adequate state remedy,341 and
have even proposed wholly different tests.842  About all that can be
337. 497 F.2d at 6 n.9.
338. Id. at 10.
339. United States v. Oregon State Bar, 43 U.S.L.W. 2234 (D. Ore. Nov. 25, 1974).
The District Court found the Parker exemption unavailable because the Oregon fee
schedule failed to meet any criteria for exemption. The factual differences between the
Oregon case and Goldfarb were slight, and the former decision was explicitly based on
a disagreement with the Fourth Circuit as to the law. Id.
340. See Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (regulated company not al-
lowed to claim exemption where it had filed false documents with state regulatory com-
mission which subsequently approved company's practices, since company's falsification
and not state approval was "cause" of anticompetitive practice); Note, supra note 295,
at 1258-65.
341. See Washington Gas Light Co. v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 438 F.2d 248,
252 (4th Cir. '1971) (plaintiff chastised in dicta by Craven, J., for "failure to promptly
protest" to the appropriate state agency); Handler, Twenty-Fourth Annual Antitrust Re-
view-Parker v. Brown Revisited, 72 CoLum. L. REv. 4, 13 (1972).
342. See Slater, supra note 291, at 101-08 (proposing a balancing test to weigh the
benefits of state regulation against the injury to competition).
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said with certitude in the midst of this sea of confusion is that (1) a
conscientious application of almost any of the test factors discussed here
would lead to a refusal to exempt bar associations' fee-fixing activities
from the antitrust laws, while a superficial result-oriented application
of all the tests combined could rationalize granting the exemption; and
(2) in some circuits, at least, it is possible that appropriate legislation
could "rehabilitate" fee schedules and qualify them for the exemption,
although lawyers' unwillingness to submit to closer supervision and
legislators' unwillingness to anger constituents already intolerant of the
bar may make this outcome unlikely.
V. CONCLUSION
If the Supreme Court applies existing antitrust case law to Gold-
farb, it seems almost inevitable that the Fourth Circuit's opinion as
to the local bar association will be reversed. However, the Court would
be justified in considering this case as one of first impression and
might take this opportunity to expressly recognize some exemption,
such as the "learned profession" exemption, to save fee schedules. If
fee schedules are held to be in violation of the Sherman Act, Con-
gress will probably be asked to pass legislation to grant lawyers a spe-
cial exemption. This legislation might take the form of the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Insurance Regulation Act,3 43 which exempts insurance
companies from federal antitrust laws so long as they are regulated by
state authorities. Perhaps legal fee schedules would be exempted if an
independent state agency had determined that they were reasonable.
If nothing is done to shield the activities of lawyers from antitrust laws,
then it is likely that the economics, as well as the nature and character,
of the practice of law will change dramatically. The consumer of le-
gal services may welcome this change; practicing lawyers will face many
difficult adjustments which all may not be able to make.
When a court is confronted with a conflict between the antitrust laws and another
federal statute, which seems to authorize activities forbidden by the antitrust measures,
it must undertake an analysis similar, but distinct, from that required under Parker in
order to determine whether the non-antitrust statute should be held to grant an "exemp-
tion." The analysis in the federal context must be different because considerations of
federalism are absent and Congress' intent in passing the non-antitrust statute may be
of great importance. In Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 444 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
the D.C. Circuit enumerated six criteria to be used in making such an analysis. See
id. at 935. At least one commentator has urged the application of this test in the Parker
situation. See Note, supra note 300. While such a transposition would seem to be un-
wise in most cases because of the disparities in the two situations, it may very well be
appropriate for a court to proceed under a Hecht-style test, instead of Parker, when a
state-approved activity is said to be justified because of its consistency with a non-anti-
trust federal statute. See note 332 supra.
343. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011 et seq. (1970).
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